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PARTISAN GERRYMANDER REVIEW AFTER
RUCHO: PROOF IS IN THE PROCEDURE
KEVIN MORRIS*
In Rucho v. Common Cause, the U.S. Supreme Court purported to end over
three decades of partisan gerrymander review by the federal courts. I believe
the Court’s decision is problematic. Partisan gerrymandering distorts
democratic governance through effects that have been increasingly
documented, and it seems likely that those effects will compound and continue
largely unabated absent the availability of federal judicial review. But my
intent is not to argue against Rucho, rather to work within its parameters and
overcome it. That means understanding the nature of the problem that the
Court wrestled with, recognizing the Court’s structural concerns, and then
tracing the limits of its reasoning. All of which, I believe, points to the
procedural guarantee of the Due Process Clause as a plausible constitutional
basis for reinvigorated federal judicial review of partisan gerrymandering
challenges. By targeting identifiable groups for vote dilution, partisan
gerrymandering functions more like adjudicatory acts rather than traditional
legislative acts, and therefore may require additional procedural safeguards in
connection with their adoption than the lawmaking process itself provides.
Moreover, review of redistricting procedures and the formulation of
corresponding safeguards, in contrast to substantive review of redistricting
maps as has been done in the past, draws on the special competence of judges.
Finally, procedural review does not shift the locus of redistricting authority but
instead de-weaponizes it; it does not attempt to wrest control but only to
formalize it. A judicial focus on redistricting procedures can thus limit and
discipline review so as to prevent judicial overreach, a concern which has long
troubled the Court, while at the same time checking the worst partisan
redistricting abuses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Free and fair elections are like the grammar of democracy, to which
partisan gerrymandering represents an error. A very serious one. For the last
several decades, the federal courts remained an open forum for litigants
challenging partisan gerrymanders as unconstitutional. But that may have come
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to an end with the Supreme Court’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause,1
which held that claims of excessive partisanship in redistricting are not
justiciable—that is, not suitable for federal judicial resolution. Fearing that
federal courts might become mired in politics, the Court in Rucho seemingly
closed the courthouse doors to such claims—or did it? I will argue that there
may yet remain daylight for federal judicial review.
My present purpose is twofold—first, in practical terms, to underscore the
problem; and second, in (principally) legal terms, to outline and argue for a
judicial proposal to curtail it. To that end, Section II provides background on
the practice of partisan gerrymandering and surveys its troublesome political
effects. This Section also reviews the history of partisan gerrymandering
challenges in the Supreme Court, up to and including the Court’s decision in
Rucho. In Rucho, the Court repeated longstanding institutional concerns over
judicial meddling in political affairs before ultimately concluding that partisan
gerrymandering challenges “present political questions beyond the reach of the
federal courts.”2 After examining how the Court ended up there, Section III
diagnoses the basic conceptual puzzle at the center of the Court’s reasoning and
also traces the legal limits of that reasoning, which together suggest the outlines
of a reinvigorated but restrained federal court role in curbing the worst excesses
of partisan redistricting.
Section IV suggests that the prospect of judicial review remains even after
Rucho, particularly via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
On that note, this Article is principally forward-looking. My aim is not to
wrestle with Rucho but to overcome it. With that in mind, any continued role
for the federal courts in remedying the worst partisan redistricting abuses must
comport with Rucho’s reasoning and meet the justiciability prerequisites
articulated therein. Because those conditions will serve as a roadmap for what
follows, I recite them here at the outset. According to Rucho, any exercise of
judicial review must (1) identify a plausible constitutional basis, (2) be guided
by judicially manageable standards, and (3) exhibit a limited scope of review.3
Section V makes the case. Proceeding serially through the Rucho
conditions, this Section argues, first, that the Due Process Clause—specifically,
its procedural aspect—represents a plausible constitutional basis for grounding
federal judicial review of partisan gerrymandering challenges. We know from
Rucho that the Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment do not fit the
bill—so I’ve looked elsewhere.4 The right to vote is fundamental in our

1.
2.
3.
4.

Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019).
Id. at 2506–07.
Id.
See id. at 2499, 2504.
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democratic system of government,5 and the Court has held that its dilution and
devaluation through partisan gerrymandering constitutes a cognizable injury.6
Moreover, because partisan gerrymandering is, I argue, functionally akin to
adjudication as opposed to traditional legislation, those affected may be entitled
under the Due Process Clause to greater procedural protections than the
lawmaking process alone affords. That is where the federal courts can carve
out a role. In other words, the judiciary can police the process by which
redistricting plans are enacted, ensuring that such process squares with
constitutionally mandated safeguards. Next, this Section shows that procedural
review can foster the development of judicially manageable standards which
eluded the Court in Rucho. Lastly, this Section demonstrates that procedural
review satisfies the final prerequisite to justiciability set out in Rucho.
Specifically, as shown by courts in other contexts and echoed by scholars, a
judicial focus on process over substance can promote democratic governance
while simultaneously limiting the risk of institutional encroachment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What is Partisan Gerrymandering?
Because this Article offers a solution, we ought to begin by establishing
some intimacy with the problem. Partisan gerrymandering is the practice of
deliberately redrawing geographic district lines to tilt voting outcomes for
partisan advantage. The practice gets its name from Elbridge Gerry, the former
governor of Massachusetts who approved the State’s highly partisan 1812
districting map, the salamander-like contours of which inspired the curious
epithet (“Gerry-mander”).7 Geometric oddity aside, however, one might
wonder from the start—what’s the trouble? Is partisan gerrymandering a
genuine problem? Or, given that American politics is transparently a contest
for official influence, is the practice instead just a form of electioneering
gamesmanship incident to political sport? The answer, I believe, is that partisan
gerrymandering is deeply troublesome. It gives rise to a spectrum of political
effects that corrode the presuppositions of representative democracy itself,

5. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964) (“Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.”); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992)
(“It is beyond cavil that ‘voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional
structure.’”) (quoting Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979);
National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511, § 20501(a)(1) (2021) (“The
Congress finds that (1) the right of citizens of the United States to vote is a fundamental right.”).
6. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 125, 143 (1986).
7. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494.
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effects that have been documented with increasing clarity in recent years.8 I
will not attempt here to exhaustively recount the vices that attend the practice
as my principal design lies elsewhere, but I will nevertheless present a survey
to motivate the proposal that follows.
Let’s start with redistricting itself. Redistricting is the process of redrawing
the lines that divide the electorate into voting groups for purposes of
determining legislative representation. Each state redraws its district lines at
least once a decade following decennial census returns.9 The basic purpose of
redistricting, at least when legitimate, is to secure “fair and effective
representation for all citizens” as populations shift and grow.10 States are
responsible for redistricting—both for federal congressional delegations11 and
state legislative seats12—and each state does things a bit differently,13 albeit
subject to certain legal limitations in each case.14 In most states, the legislature
is the body responsible for drawing district maps, which are adopted just like
other pieces of legislation.15 Several states, however, employ commissions of

8. See, e.g., Devin Caughey, Chris Tausanovitch & Christopher Warshaw, Partisan
Gerrymandering and the Political Process: Effects on Roll-Call Voting and State Policies, 16 ELECT.
L.J. 453 (2017); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Causes and Consequences of Gerrymandering, 59
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115 (2018); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Christopher Warshaw, The Impact
of Partisan Gerrymandering on Political Parties, 45 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 609 (2020); JUSTIN LEVITT &
ERIKA
WOOD,
A
CITIZEN’S
GUIDE
TO
REDISTRICTING
10–15
(2010),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/citizens-guide-redistricting-2010-edition
[https://perma.cc/446M-893R].
9. See LEVITT & WOOD, supra note 8, at 16; see generally Justin Levitt & Michael P. McDonald,
Taking the “Re” out of Redistricting: State Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1247 (2007); 50 STATE GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/50-state-guide-redistricting [https://perma.cc/4C75-M5X9].
10. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565–66 (1964); see also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735, 753 (1973) (“The very essence of districting is to produce a different—a more ‘politically fair’—
result than would be reached with elections at large, in which the winning party would take 100% of
the legislative seats.”).
11. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004) (“Article I, § 4,
while leaving in state legislatures the initial power to draw districts for federal elections, permitted
Congress to ‘make or alter’ those districts if it wished.”).
12. Arizona State Legis. v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 576 U.S. 787, 808 (2015)
(“[R]edistricting is a legislative function, to be performed in accordance with the State's prescriptions
for lawmaking.”).
13. See LEVITT & WOOD, supra note 8, at 20–36; see generally Michael P. McDonald, A
Comparative Analysis of Redistricting Institutions in the United States, 2001–2002, 4 STATE POL. &
POL’Y Q. 371, 372 (2004).
14. For example, States must comply with the “one person, one vote” rule established by the
Supreme Court, and they cannot redistrict on the basis of race. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause,
139 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2019). Congress has the authority to regulate congressional elections under the
Elections Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1., and the States also have independent authority to
regulate the redistricting process, see LEVITT & WOOD, supra note 8, at 20–36, 68–71; Rucho, 139 S.
Ct. at 2507–08.
15. See LEVITT & WOOD, supra note 8, at 20–36.
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varying composition to aid in the process, whether by recommending plans or,
in a handful of cases, assuming primary mapmaking responsibility.16
There is general agreement that redistricting should accommodate some
mixture of traditional neutral criteria such as district size, shape (compactness
and contiguity), and composition (including, for example, minority
representation), together with political boundaries like county or municipality
lines, and geographic boundaries like waterways or mountains.17 However,
because redistricting leads to predictable electoral outcomes—at present,
technology and detailed election data enable “very, very, very well-informed
guesses”18 regarding future voting behavior—partisan influence on redistricting
is inevitable.19 But that’s not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, “redistricting in
most cases will implicate a political calculus in which various interests compete
for recognition”20—and appropriately so.21 When single-member districts are
the norm, as is the case throughout the United States, political redistricting
considerations can actually promote certain “desirable democratic ends, such
as maintaining relatively stable legislatures”22 and enhancing legislative
responsiveness.23 Accordingly, some measure of partisan bias is expected and
permitted.24 The key issue, as we will see, is judging the right dosage.25

16. See id.
17. See id. at 50–56; Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in
part, and dissenting in part) (noting that “the Court [in Reynolds] plainly recognized that redistricting
should be based on a number of neutral criteria, of which districts of equal population was only one”);
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (noting traditional districting criteria); Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (same); see generally Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science
Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77 (1985) (articulating and reviewing redistricting criteria).
18. LEVITT & WOOD, supra note 8, at 57; see also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. at 2513
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that “advancements in computing technology” and the availability of
“more granular data about party preference and voting behavior than ever before” have made enabled
mapmakers to “insulate[] politicians against all but the most titanic shifts in the political tides”).
19. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 128 (“It is not only obvious, but absolutely unavoidable, that the
location and shape of districts may well determine the political complexion of the area. District lines
are rarely neutral phenomena.”); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 298 (2004) (“[S]ome intent
to gain political advantage is inescapable whenever political bodies devise a district plan . . . .”).
20. Miller, 515 U.S. at 914.
21. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 356–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 360.
23. See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative
Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 554 (1994); Michael S. Kang, The Bright Side of Partisan
Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J. L. PUB. POL’Y 443, 456–58 (2005).
24. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2497 (2019).
25. See id. at 2497 (“The ‘central problem’ [in reviewing partisan gerrymandering
challenges] . . . is ‘determining when political gerrymandering has gone too far.’”); Vieth, 541 U.S. at
296–97 (noting that the “central problem” is solving an unanswerable question—namely, “[h]ow much
political motivation and effect is too much?”).
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B. Political Effects
Democracy assumes at its foundation that “[s]ince legislatures are
responsible for enacting laws by which all citizens are to be governed, they
should be bodies which are collectively responsive to the popular will.”26 Yet
by cleverly divvying the electorate to mute political opposition, gerrymanders
deliberately erode that assumption. Partisan gerrymandering thus frays the
“intimate sympathy”27 between the government and the governed on which
representative democracy depends, inverting the “core principle of republican
government”—namely, that “voters should choose their representatives, not the
other way around.”28
That, in a nutshell, is the problem. And it is not a hollow bromide, as we’ll
see below. The practice has a long history of occurrence and condemnation in
this country.29 It was “known in the Colonies prior to Independence, and the
Framers were familiar with it at the time of the drafting and ratification of the
Constitution.”30 And in our young nation’s first congressional elections, none
other than George Washington accused Patrick Henry of drawing Virginia’s
district lines to deny a seat to James Madison.31 Not long after, the practice was
baptized in infamy with Governor Gerry’s contorted map, widely decried for
its flagrancy.32
The deep dissonance between partisan entrenchment and representative
democracy may be intuitive enough, but empirical evidence confirms that
gerrymandering has pronounced effects on our political process, trickling down
from distorted legislative composition through party activities to individual
voting behavior.33 Political scientists have developed various statistical metrics
to gauge partisan redistricting bias. They differ in assumptions and mechanics,
but their purpose is the same.34 During oral argument in the lead up to Rucho,
26. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
27. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2512 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
28. Id.; Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a
Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301, 304 (1991)
(“Gerrymandering violates the American constitutional tradition by conceding to legislatures a power
of self-selection. Self-constitutive legislatures, or self-constitutive governing institutions of any kind,
make no sense under a Constitution whose most arresting innovation was the dispersion of power.”).
29. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494 (“Partisan gerrymandering is nothing new. Nor is frustration
with it.”).
30. Id.
31. See id.; LEVITT & WOOD, supra note 8, at 8.
32. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494.
33. See generally Caughey, Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 8; Stephanopoulos, supra note
8; Stephanopoulos & Warshaw, supra note 8.
34. See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, The Measure of A Metric:
The Debate Over Quantifying Partisan Gerrymandering, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1503 (2018); Eric McGhee,
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Chief Justice Roberts dismissed such metrics as “sociological gobbledygook,”35
and others have expressed doubt about the use of quantitative methods in
adjudicating constitutional rights.36 Putting aside the merit of social science as
an extra-legal source of constitutional hallmarks, however, empirically based
statistical metrics remain perhaps the most objective tools available for judging
the effect of partisan gerrymandering on the political process.37 In other words,
even if such tools are not themselves fashioned into a solution, they can
nonetheless help us assess the problem.
As an illustration, the efficiency gap measures partisan districting bias by
calculating the comparative share of each party’s “wasted” votes in an
election.38 Wasted votes are those that, given the composition of the relevant
district, effectively have no electoral impact—in other words, “all the votes cast
for a party in a district that the party loses, as well as the votes cast in excess of
50% in a district that the party wins.”39 The idea is that partisan gerrymanders
deliberately minimize the number of wasted votes for the favored party while
maximizing the number of wasted votes for the opposition. That means that
partisan bias can be evaluated by measuring the relative efficiency by which
favored party votes are converted into favorable election results.40 To illustrate,
suppose that Party A loses District 1 with a popular vote of 49%, then all of the
Party A votes in District 1 are wasted; and further suppose that Party A wins
District 2 with a popular vote of 99%, then 49% (or 99% minus 50%) of the
Party A votes in District 2 are likewise wasted. In each case, Party A
accumulates far more wasted votes than its political opposition—say, Party B.
Partisan gerrymanders aggregate these results across the entire redistricting

Partisan Gerrymandering and Political Science, 23 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 171 (2020); Bernard
Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan
Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2 (2007).
35. See Adam Liptak, A Case for Math, Not ‘Gobbledygook,’ in Judging Partisan Voting Maps,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2018. The Chief Justice made the comment during oral argument for Gill v.
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018); Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916
(2018) (No. 16-1161).
36. See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 468–69 n.9 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part, and
dissenting in part) (“I believe it is the role of this Court, not social scientists, to determine how much
partisan dominance is too much.”); Jacob Eisler, Partisan Gerrymandering and the
Constitutionalization of Statistics, 68 EMORY L.J. 979, 983 (2019) (“Judicial adoption of a radically
new definition of rights as quantitative outcomes would be novel and problematic. It would transform
the role of statistical analysis from providing evidence of rights violations to defining the content of
rights.”).
37. See McGhee, supra note 34, at 177.
38. See McGhee, supra note 34, at 174–75; see generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric
M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015).
39. McGhee, supra note 34, at 174; see also Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 38, at 834.
40. See McGhee, supra note 34, at 174–75; Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 38, at 834–
35, 850.
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plan. And they work. Studies show that partisan redistricting can and does
significantly skew voting efficiency.41
For example, in a 2018 study, Nicholas Stephanopoulos examined state
house and congressional election data from 1972 to 2014 and concluded that,
as measured by the efficiency gap, “unified control of the redistricting process
significantly benefits the party in charge . . . to a greater extent than any other
variable.”42 Such control favors partisan tilt more than other factors often
thought to influence districting fairness, such as a State’s minority
representation or political geography. By skewing voting efficiency, the
favored party in power thus secures exaggerated legislative representation.
Evidence further suggests that partisan gerrymandering also causes
ideological distortion—that is, its impact extends beyond legislative seat counts
alone. Partisan gerrymanders shift the “ideological location of the median voter
in the legislature,”43 which, in turn, strongly influences policymaking.44 As one
set of commentators recently explained:
[P]artisan gerrymandering does not merely make it easier for
one party to win elections. Rather, by biasing the relationship
between votes and seats, it also undermines congruence with
voters’ preferences, skewing the ideological composition of the
legislature and the ideological character of policymaking away
from the preferences of the median voter (and thus from a
majority of the electorate).45
Here’s how it works. When a party wins a legislative majority, it shifts the
ideological valence of the median legislator.46 In other words, “[a]s the seat
share of the majority party grows, the median [legislator] will be closer to the
center of the majority party.”47 Median legislators, in turn, have a
disproportionate influence on policymaking because “new legislation cannot
pass without the median’s support.”48 Thus, as legislative composition and
median ideological valence bend, so does policy.49 And policy, after all, is
where gerrymanders cash out. Tracing the straight line from redistricting
through skewed electoral results and legislative seat shares to median
legislators and policymaking, we can see the political significance of partisan
gerrymanders. That significance underscores both the powerful political
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See, e.g., Stephanopoulos, supra note 8, at 2143.
Stephanopoulos, supra note 8, at 2143 (emphasis added).
Caughey, Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 8, at 457.
Id. at 456–57, 464–65.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 462.
Id.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 464–65.
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incentive to devise gerrymanders, and the perversity that follows when they are
successfully deployed. To make matters worse, many of the effects noted
above are lasting.50 The disabling consequences of gerrymandering on party
function are likely to “play out over several future elections.”51 Further, enacted
legislation—the central ambition of partisan gerrymanders—is notoriously
difficult to reverse, “not least because new laws require majorities in both
legislative chambers (or supermajorities, if vetoed by the governor).”52
The effects also extend further downstream, beyond legislative composition
and policymaking and into the functioning of political parties themselves.53
Evidence shows that systematic frustration of political aims through partisan
disadvantage wrought by gerrymanders erodes party health, demoralizing and
ultimately demobilizing opposition party voters, thus compounding the effects
noted above.54 These results are most pronounced on “party elites” like party
officials, donors and candidates—that is, those individuals and groups with the
most to lose.55 For example, partisan districting disadvantage has resulted in
material reductions in candidate quality, the number of districts contested, and
fund-raising success.56 Similar though less pronounced effects extend to the
rank-and-file, as evidenced by reduced voter turnout.57 These effects have now
been observed and measured—and the more severe the disadvantage, the more
severe the result.58
Data analysis and advanced mapmaking techniques are also exacerbating
the problem by facilitating ever more potent gerrymanders. Technological
advances have “ma[de] gerrymanders far more effective and durable than
before, insulating politicians against all but the most titanic shifts in political
tides.”59 And the payoff? Here are some examples. A North Carolina
50. See, e.g., Caughey, Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 8, at 468; Stephanopoulos &
Warshaw, supra note 8, at 609; Samuel S.–H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan
Gerrymandering, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1263, 1268 (2016) (“[C]hanges in technical tools and population
clustering, as well as a greater awareness of the advantages of aggressive districting, further enhance
the possibility that gerrymandered districts may be more durable now than they were even ten years
ago.”).
51. Stephanopoulos & Warshaw, supra note 8, at 621.
52. Caughey, Tausanovitch & Warshaw, supra note 8, at 459.
53. See Stephanopoulos & Warshaw, supra note 8, at 635.
54. See id. at 610, 612.
55. Id. at 610, 612.
56. Id. at 635, 636.
57. Id. at 610.
58. Id. at 636.
59. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2513 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 364 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The combination of increasingly
precise map-drawing technology and increasingly frequent map drawing means that a party may be
able to bring about a gerrymander that is not only precise, but virtually impossible to dislodge. Thus,
court action may prove necessary.”); Wang, supra note 50, at 1268–69.
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redistricting plan challenged in Rucho was drawn by Republicans using
advanced mapmaking technology and secured the following results in back-toback elections: (i) in 2016, Republican congressional candidates won 10 of 13
state seats on 53% of the statewide vote; (ii) in 2018, Republican congressional
candidates won 9 of 12 seats on 50% of the statewide vote.60 Maryland
Democrats employed similar technology to achieve similarly distorted results
in the other redistricting map challenged in Rucho.61 Unfortunately, the North
Carolina and Maryland plans are emblematic but not unique.62 Indeed,
statistical evidence indicates that partisan redistricting distortion has worsened
over time as our politics have become increasingly polarized,63 and continuing
technological advances will no doubt push that trend.
To summarize, partisan gerrymanders are anathema to the logic and design
of representative democracy, have had documented and potentially long-lasting
effects on the political process ranging from policymaking to party health, and
technology has and will continue to improve the efficiency with which favored
parties can force their advantage. The short sketch above ought, I hope, to have
signaled a genuine problem—or set of problems—that calls out for correction.
If so, what role, if any, should the federal courts play? In Rucho, the Court set
aside three decades of precedent and answered: None.64 To be sure, other
avenues for reform remain—namely, federal legislation, state legislation, and
even state litigation.65 But none offer more than a dull glimmer of hope.
Congress and state legislatures each have the power to regulate the redistricting
process, but any prospect of legislative reform is beset with obvious and
intractable conflicts of interest. As the dissent in Rucho pointed out, “[t]he
politicians who benefit from partisan gerrymandering are unlikely to change
partisan gerrymandering. And because those politicians maintain themselves

60. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2510 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
61. See id. Maryland’s gerrymandered map enabled Democrats to win seven out of eight House
seats in four consecutive elections from 2012–2018 without having received more than 65% of the
vote in any single election. Id at 2511.
62. See id. at 2513.
63. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 38, at 836 (calculating partisan efficiency-gap
trends over time from 1972 to 2012 and concluding that “[t]he severity of today’s gerrymandering
is . . . unprecedented in modern times”); Delia Baldassarri & Andrew Gelman, Partisans Without
Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion, 114 AM. J. SOC. 408, 423–
27 (2008) (concluding that across economic, foreign-policy, civil-rights, and moral issues, partisanship
has increased over time); Michael S. Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1379,
1380 (2020) (noting that “Democrats and Republicans have not been more bitterly divided along
partisan lines since Reconstruction, nor more aggressively hostile to each other in the history of the
two major parties.”).
64. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506–08.
65. See id. at 2507–08.
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in office through partisan gerrymandering, the chances for legislative reform
are slight.”66
I will review the Rucho decision as the pivot to my proposal that follows,
but we can profitably work our way into the Court’s conclusion if we view it as
representing the culminating resolution of a long-standing tension within the
Court itself regarding the propriety of judicial intervention into the domain of
electoral redistricting. That tension brewed at the surface of the Court’s earlier
partisan gerrymandering decisions, to which I turn next.
C. Legal Status
The Court’s partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence has been marked by a
conspicuous tension between honoring democratic principles, on the one hand,
and the institutional constraints under which those principles operate, on the
other. We will see this theme repeated several times, as the contest played out
over decades. The Court has acknowledged that free and fair elections are
fundamental to representative democracy67 and, further, that partisan
gerrymandering frustrates that imperative.68 So, in the context of partisan
66. Id. at 2524 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 446 n.20
(1965) (“If . . . the legislature assumes executive and judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be
made; nor, if made, can it be effectual; because in that case they may put their proceedings into the
form of an act of assembly, which will render them obligatory on the other branches. They have
accordingly in many instances, decided rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy.”)
(quoting Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 157–58 (Paul Leicester Ford ed. 1894) (court
addition of emphasis omitted)). On this point, it must be mentioned that the most recent legislative
effort to ban partisan gerrymandering of congressional districts—the Freedom to Vote: John R. Lewis
Act—was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives but stalled in the U.S. Senate in January 2022.
Freedom to Vote: John R. Lewis Act, H.R. 5746, 117th Cong. §§ 5001, 5003 (2021–22),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5746/actions [https://perma.cc/5Q3M3WGR].
67. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“The right to vote freely for the
candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right
strike at the heart of representative government.”).
68. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (holding that partisan gerrymanders
may constitute unconstitutional discrimination insofar as they “consistently degrade a voter’s or a
group of voters’ influence on the political process as a whole”); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292
(2004) (acknowledging the “incompatibility of severe partisan gerrymanders with democratic
principles”); id. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that “use of purely political boundary-drawing
factors can amount to a serious . . . [constitutional] abuse” in the form of partisan entrenchment); id. at
343 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he consequence of a vote cast can be minimized or maximized
[through redistricting], and if unfairness is sufficiently demonstrable, the guarantee of equal protection
condemns it as a denial of substantial equality.”); id. at 317–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The concept
of equal justice under law requires the State to govern impartially. . . . [but] when partisanship is the
legislature’s sole motivation—when any pretense of neutrality is forsaken unabashedly and all
traditional districting criteria are subverted for partisan advantage—the governing body cannot be said
to have acted impartially.”); Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506 (acknowledging that partisan gerrymandering
is “incompatible with democratic principles”); id. at 2525 (J. Kagan, dissenting) (“[G]errymandering
is, as so many Justices have emphasized before, anti-democratic in the most profound sense.”).
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gerrymandering challenges, it has shown a corresponding impulse to vindicate
democratic principles and the fundamental right to vote which they
presuppose.69 However, the Court has also shown a second, countervailing
impulse to guard against judicial trespass over institutional boundaries—
specifically, the boundary separating the judicial and legislative powers of
government.70 The latter impulse ultimately prevailed in Rucho, when the
Court weighted institutional over democratic integrity in denying federal
judicial review.
i. Davis v. Bandemer
Partisan gerrymander review in the federal courts officially began with the
Court’s fractured decision in Davis v. Bandemer.71 In Bandemer, a majority of
the Court held that such claims are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment yet failed to agree on the appropriate governing
standard. Four Justices agreed on one standard;72 two on another;73 while three
disclaimed judicial involvement entirely.74 The four-Justice plurality standard
prevailed for the time being, requiring plaintiffs to show (i) partisan intent and
(ii) discriminatory effects in order to invalidate a redistricting plan.75 Partisan
intent would be easy enough to demonstrate, the plurality reasoned, given that
69. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 143 (partisan gerrymandering challenges are justiciable); Vieth,
541 U.S. at 355–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 343 (Souter, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 317
(Stevens, J. dissenting) (same); Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (same).
70. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 133 (eschewing a “low threshold” for partisan gerrymandering
challenges because it would “too much embroil the judiciary in second-guessing what has consistently
been referred to as a political task for the legislature”); id. at 161 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
judgment) (stating that the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering challenges poses “unacceptable”
risks to our political institutions); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 291 (plurality) (expressing concern that the
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims will result in the “courts intrusion into a process that
is the very foundation of democratic decisionmaking”); Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507 (stating that the
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering challenges constitutes an “expansion of judicial authority”
into “one of the most intensely partisan aspects of American political life”).
71. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 109.
72. See id. at 113–44 (plurality consisting of J. White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun).
73. See id. at 161–85 (partial concurrence consisting of J. Powell and Stevens).
74. See id. at 144–61 (concurrence consisting of J. O’Connor, Burger, and C.J. Rehnquist).
75. See id. at 127. Justices Powell and Stevens, who supported justiciability, agreed with the
plurality’s standard in general but disagreed on emphasis. Id. at 161–62 (Powell, J., concurring in part,
and dissenting in part). The plurality essentially took discriminatory intent for granted, id. at 129 (“As
long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely
political consequences of the reapportionment were intended.”) but required challengers to meet a
heavy burden in proving discriminatory effects. Justices Powell and Stevens, by contrast, would have
required only a reduced showing of discriminatory effects if the record as a whole—including “the
configurations of the districts, the observance of political subdivision lines, and other criteria that have
independent relevance to the fairness of redistricting”—supported a finding that the mapmaker acted
with no other purpose than to promote partisan advantage, id. at 165, 171–72 n.10, 173 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
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politics is “inseparable from districting.”76 But in order to avoid “embroil[ing]
the judiciary in second-guessing . . . a political task for the legislature,”77 the
plurality stringently construed the effects prong to require that plaintiffs present
extensive evidence demonstrating “the electoral system is arranged in a manner
that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the
political process as a whole.”78 This standard was criticized as cloudy and
unworkable both by members of the Court that supported justiciability79 and by
those who did not.80
Justice O’Connor, for example, adopting a tone of skepticism echoed in
later cases, would have rejected justiciability altogether, as she concluded that
the Equal Protection Clause simply “does not supply judicially manageable
standards for resolving purely political gerrymandering claims.”81 For Justice
O’Connor, the problem wasn’t just with the plurality’s standard, but with any
proposed standard. The reason being that partisan gerrymandering challenges
rely, even if only in a “loose” sense, upon the substantive notion of proportional
representation—that is, that electoral results should be commensurate with
statewide popular support.82 But, according to Justice O’Connor, the Equal
Protection Clause does not supply such a norm because “winner-take-all,
district-based elections” like those employed throughout the country almost
never produce strictly proportional results.83 And “[a]bsent any such norm [of
proportional representation],” Justice O’Connor continued, any proposed
standard must by necessity be “so standardless as to make adjudication of
political gerrymandering claims impossible.”84
Sounding the institutional alarm, Justice O’Connor warned that judicial
redistricting review would end in “pervasive and unwarranted judicial
superintendence” of state legislatures as the courts, lacking relevant expertise,
“attempt[ed] to recreate the complex process of legislative apportionment.”85
The risks posed by such judicial intervention—specifically, “political

76. Id. at 128 (White, J.).
77. Id. at 133.
78. Id. at 132.
79. See id. at 171 (Powell, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part) (“The final and most
basic flaw in the plurality’s opinion is its failure to enunciate any standard that affords guidance to
legislatures and courts.”).
80. See id. at 145, 155 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that the “nebulous”
standard proposed by the plurality would “either prove unmanageable and arbitrary or else evolve
towards some loose form of proportionality” unsupported by the Equal Protection Clause).
81. Id. at 147.
82. See id. at 156–57.
83. See id. at 158–60.
84. Id. at 157.
85. Id. at 147.
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instability and judicial malaise”86—were unacceptable, and she concluded that
redistricting must therefore remain a political matter outside the federal courts’
reach.
ii. Vieth v. Jubelirer
Collective indecision again plagued the Court decades later when it next
took up the matter in a pair of cases in short succession—Vieth v. Jubelirer87
and League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC ) v. Perry.88 The Court
reviewed and rejected the partisan gerrymandering challenges in each case, but
in neither case did a majority of the Court articulate a governing standard to
clarify matters after Bandemer. In Vieth, the more important of the two, four
Justices voted in favor of continued justiciability but offered three different
review standards89—notably, each different than the Bandemer plurality’s
standard—and four Justices voted against justiciability.90 Justice Kennedy, the
ninth and remaining Justice, brokered an unsatisfying compromise of sorts.
Justice Scalia, writing for the four Justices rejecting judicial involvement,
conceded that “an excessive injection of politics [in redistricting] is unlawful,”91
but he nevertheless echoed Justice O’Connor’s institutional concerns about
judicial encroachment into political affairs absent a manageable governing
standard.92 In words that would themselves be repeated years later in Rucho,
Justice Scalia distilled and reformulated the issue presented by partisan
gerrymandering challenges, explaining that the “central problem” is
determining “[h]ow much political motivation and effect is too much?”93 But
that question, according to Justice Scalia, is “unanswerable” because it

86. Id.
87. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
88. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
89. First, Justice Stevens, largely following Justice Powell’s opinion in Bandemer, would have
held a partisan gerrymander unconstitutional insofar as the record showed that “partisanship is the
legislature’s sole motivation—when any pretense of neutrality is forsaken unabashedly, and all
traditional districting criteria are subverted for partisan advantage.” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 318 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Second, Justice Breyer would have adopted a similar standard, proposing that courts
look for indicia of “the unjustified use of political factors to entrench a minority in power.” Id. at 360
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Third, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
proposed a five-part test modelled after the burden-shifting framework developed in the context of
employment law, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), to ferret out the
legislature’s redistricting motives. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 346–47 (Souter, J., dissenting).
90. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281, 305–06 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Thomas)
(plurality opinion).
91. Id. at 293 (emphasis in original).
92. See id. at 291 (stressing the necessity of clear judicial standards “to meaningfully constrain
the discretion of the courts, and to win public acceptance for the courts’ intrusion into a process that is
the very foundation of democratic decisionmaking”).
93. Id. at 291, 296–97 (emphasis added).
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“requires a quantifying judgment that is unguided and ill-suited to the
development of judicial standards.”94 Here we see Justice Scalia directly tuning
in Justice O’Connor’s Bandemer critique. The difficulty, plainly put, is with
judicial measurement.
Trying to gauge partisan excess will inevitably, Justice Scalia urged,
ensnare the federal courts in electoral determinations outside their
competence.95 The political process itself should, instead, be trusted to work
out a remedy.96 Any assist the federal courts might offer in expediting such
remedy, he continued, did not justify the “regular insertion of the judiciary into
districting, with the delay and uncertainty that brings to the political process
and the partisan enmity it brings upon the courts.”97
Though the dissenting Justices in Vieth offered individual variations, they
all sounded the same themes. Namely—first, that the federal courts have an
important role to play in identifying and remedying the worst redistricting
abuses; and second, that the judiciary is capable of determining whether a map
“crosses the constitutional line”98 between permissible and excessive partisan
bias.99 Regarding that line of demarcation, which Justice Scalia found so
elusive, the key for each of the dissenters was for the courts to look not for
precise articulation but instead for “strong indicia of [partisan] abuse.”100
“Instead of coming up with a[n] [exact] verbal formula for too much,”101 which
Justice Souter acknowledged in dissent could prove an impossible task, “the
Court’s job must be to identify [objective] clues . . . indicating that partisan
competition has reached an extremity of unfairness.”102 Those clues would
include, among other things, consideration of the map’s respect for traditional
districting principles,103 deviation from hypothetical, impartially drawn
comparator maps,104 and scrutiny of the “process by which the districting
schemes were enacted.”105

94. Id. at 296.
95. See id. at 290 (“[R]equiring judges to decide whether a districting system will produce a
statewide majority for a majority party casts them forth upon a sea of imponderables, and asks them to
make determinations that not even election experts can agree upon.”).
96. See id. at 276–281.
97. Id. at 301.
98. Id. at 367 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 336, 344, 365.
100. Id. at 365.
101. Id. at 344 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. See id. at 318, 335–36 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 367 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 347–
50 (Souter, J., dissenting).
104. See id. at 349–50 (Souter, J., dissenting).
105. See id. at 323 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Kennedy, at the center of these two camps, managed to blend them
in a provisional compromise. He too was animated by an institutional concern
that “intervening courts—even when proceeding with the best intentions—
would risk assuming political, not legal, responsibility for a process that often
produces ill will and distrust.”106 But, recognizing that partisan gerrymanders
burden the rights of voters and thereby threaten democratic principles, he was
also reluctant to entirely foreclose judicial review.107 In the end, Justice
Kennedy resolved the Court split in favor of justiciability—with a caveat.
Justice Kennedy rejected all existing proposals but preserved justiciability on
the possibility that “workable standards” might emerge at some later date.108
But, then again, they might not.109 This, unsurprisingly, only further muddied
the legal waters.110
Thus, having revisited the issue of partisan gerrymandering decades after
the confused result in Bandemer, the Court in Vieth not only failed to clarify
matters but seemed to leave the issue in a rather curious predicament. The legal
status of partisan gerrymandering challenges after Vieth occupied a kind of
superposition—challenges remained justiciable in principle but were,
effectively, nonjusticiable in fact.111 Time would tell.
iii. Rucho v. Common Cause
A decade and a half later, the waiting game seemed to end with Rucho. The
Court revisited partisan gerrymandering in a pair of cases—Gill v. Whitford,112
which addressed the issue of standing, and Rucho,113 which is the more
important case for present purposes. In Rucho, the Court appeared to end the
federal courts’ involvement, collapsing the post-Vieth uncertainty against
justiciability.114

106. Id. at 307 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
107. See id. at 309–17.
108. See id. at 311–13, 317.
109. See id. at 309 (noting that “weighty arguments [exist] for holding [partisan gerrymandering]
cases . . . to be nonjusticiable; and those arguments may prevail in the long run”).
110. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won’t Make Law: Partisan Gerrymandering and
a Structural Approach to the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1097–98 (2007).
111. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 304 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (interpreting Justice
Kennedy’s compromise position as “announcing that there may well be a valid claim [for partisan
gerrymandering], but we are not yet prepared to figure it out”).
112. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (Wis. 2018).
113. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019).
114. Id. at 2508.
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The Court’s reasoning in Rucho rings loudly with institutional concerns
over judicial encroachment into the legislative process of redistricting.115 The
decision underscored the confusion that plagued partisan gerrymandering
challenges since Bandemer, tracing that confusion to the “central problem”
articulated by Justice Scalia in Vieth—to reiterate, the challenge of crafting a
principled answer to the question of whether partisan bias is excessive.116 To
provide an answer, the Court continued, would require the development of “a
standard that can reliably differentiate” between constitutional and
unconstitutional gerrymanders.117 But skeptical that any corresponding legal
standards could be precisely and narrowly crafted to “limit and direct [judicial]
decisions,”118 the Court, like the skeptics in Bandemer and Vieth beforehand,
was spurred by concerns that judges would inevitably be drawn into the role of
legislators and invited “to make their own political judgment about how much
representation particular political parties deserve.”119 Seating such judgments
within the judiciary would, in sum, “commit [the] courts to unprecedented
intervention in the American political process.”120
The Rucho Court thus refused to shoulder the risk of judicial error, a risk it
believed was compounded by the gravity of the resulting institutional
intrusion.121 In doing so, the Court nevertheless articulated a list of essentials
prerequisite to any exercise of federal judicial review: (1) first, there must be a
“plausible grant of authority” to adjudicate the claim rooted in the Constitution;
(2) second, there must be “principled, rational” standards to guide judicial
review; and (3) third, as a corollary to the second element, the federal courts’
involvement should be limited in scope.122 The Court concluded that partisan
gerrymandering claims failed on all counts, thus rejecting justiciability and
tying a knot on the same thread of skepticism anchored in Bandemer and woven
through the Court’s intervening decisions.
I suggested above that the Court’s partisan gerrymandering decisions are
inflected with a conspicuous tension between concerns for democratic
principles and institutional constraints. In each case, Justices on either side of

115. See id. at 2502–07; see also Case Comment, Article III—Justiciability—Political Question
Doctrine—Rucho v. Common Cause, 133 HARV. L. REV. 252, 257 (2019) (“Rucho is driven in large
part by prudential considerations.”).
116. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293, 296; See generally Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2497–2501.
117. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499, 2504–05.
118. Id. at 2507.
119. Id. at 2499 (emphasis omitted).
120. Id. at 2498.
121. See id. (“With uncertain limits, intervening courts—even when proceeding with best
intentions—would risk assuming political, not legal, responsibility for a process that often produces ill
will and distrust.”) (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307 (Kennedy, J.)).
122. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2498–2502, 2507.
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the justiciability divide have nodded to the importance of these competing
elements. In Bandemer, democratic principles narrowly prevailed. In Vieth,
we saw a stalemate temporarily brokered by Justice Kennedy’s restless
admixture of then-present doubt and the possible promise of a future
reconciliation. And in Rucho, concern for institutional constraints finally won
out.
What is it about the issue presented by partisan gerrymandering challenges
that has buoyed such persistent skepticism of judicial resolution? I will now
turn to examine that question.
III. THE PUZZLE OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDER REVIEW
I believe partisan gerrymanders are amenable to court review in a way that
both protects democratic principles against legislative debasement and
preserves important institutional boundaries, as I will discuss below. But the
fact that this issue has proved so nettlesome for more than three decades should
signal that there is perhaps something peculiar either about the issue or prior
approaches. Recall that, as understood by the Court, the central problem
presented by partisan gerrymandering claims is determining exactly when
redistricting partisanship is excessive—or, to put it another way, in drawing a
precise constitutional dividing line.123 A preliminary examination of the nature
of that inquiry will both illuminate the judicial challenge presented and explain
the muddled attempts to answer it. It will also, importantly, suggest a way
ahead.
Significantly, the partisan gerrymandering claims at issue from Bandemer
through Rucho were raised and evaluated principally under the Equal Protection
Clause.124 Recent plaintiffs, including those in Rucho, have also asserted First
Amendment claims,125 but the crux under either banner is, as understood by the
Court, essentially the same.126 It is a question of measurement and degree.

123. See id at 2497–2501, 2504.
124. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272; LULAC v. Perry,
548 U.S 399 at 404, 409 (2006); Gill v. Whitford, No. 16-1161, slip op. at 1 (Wis. Ct. App. June 18,
2018); Gill v. Whiteford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1924 (2018); Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491.
125. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 409; Gill, No. 16-1161, slip op. at 1; Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491.
126. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2504–05 (stating that a First Amendment analysis of partisan
gerrymandering “provides no standard for determining when partisan activity goes too far . . . [and]
offers no ‘clear’ and ‘manageable’ way of distinguishing permissible from impermissible partisan
motivation”).
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The central problem calls for substantive line drawing and in so doing
presents what philosophers call a sorites paradox.127 The paradox emerges
when we try to precisify vague terms, and may be summarized as follows:
[I]f we are asked by gradual stages, is such and such a person
a rich man or a poor man, famous or undistinguished, are
yonder objects many or few, great or small, long or short, broad
or narrow, we do not know at what point in the addition or
subtraction to give a definite answer.128
The classic example asks how many stones make a heap (“sorites” derives
from the Greek word for “heap”)—that is, how many stones must be collected
together to create a heap of stones, or conversely, how many must be removed
from a heap to destroy it?129
Let’s illustrate. Imagine that I place a single stone in front of you. This
lone stone obviously does not constitute a heap. Now I place a second stone, a
third, a fourth, and so on, adding stones to the growing collection one at a time.
At what point does the collection of stones in front of you become a heap?
Surely by the time I reach, say, a billion stones—right? But can we point to a
single stone along the way that marks the transition from non-heap to heap? It
seems not. But if not, does that mean we never actually arrive at a heap of
stones, no matter how large the collection? Now imagine, conversely, that a
truck dumps a billion stones in front of you to start. In this alternative scenario,
you begin with what is indisputably a heap of stones. Imagine this time that I
remove stones, rather than adding them—again, one at a time. When there is
just a solitary stone remaining, we would like to say that what began as a heap
is no longer—correct? But can we point to a single stone that marks the
transition, this time in reverse, from heap to non-heap? Again, it seems not.
And if not, does that mean we never actually make the transition at all? That’s
the paradox. It appears that every collection of stones both is and is not a heap.
The puzzle arises when our demands become misaligned with our ordinary
linguistic expectations. For many descriptive terms—for example, terms like
heap, or qualifiers like excessive (along with innumerable others)—we assume
that very small, incremental changes in the object under inquiry do not actually
make a difference.130 We don’t ordinarily ask questions like, “exactly how
many stones make up a heap?,” or similarly, “exactly how much spaghetti is

127. See STEPHEN READ, THINKING ABOUT LOGIC: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHT OF
LOGIC 173–202 (1994); DOMINIC HYDE & DIANA RAFFMAN, Sorites Paradox, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev. 2018).
128. READ, supra note 127, at 173 (quoting Cicero, Academica, tr. H. Rackman, bk. 2 at 49 and
92).
129. READ, supra note 127, at 173–74.
130. See id. at 173–74; HYDE & RAFFMAN, supra note 127, at 4.
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too much for dinner?,” because we don’t ordinarily expect exact answers.
Course-grained questions simply do not call for fine-grained answers. But if
we nevertheless insist on precision where our ordinary language itself does not
demand (or supply) it, as I have tried to show with the scenarios above, we are
in trouble from the start. Some terms are unavoidably fuzzy and attempts to cut
fine edges are destined for paradox. “In whatever form, the challenge of the
sorites argument is to identify a [precise] cut-off point [for imprecise terms].”131
The soritical nature of the issue presented by partisan gerrymandering
challenges is evident on the face of Justice Scalia’s distillation—to paraphrase,
how can courts determine when redistricting partisanship is excessive? To
make the analogy plain, let’s tease it out a bit. The central question presupposes
a rough spectrum of partisan redistricting bias, perhaps starting with a map at
one pole that does in fact exactly achieve proportional representation and
ending at the opposite pole with something like a generalized statute declaring
“[a]ll future apportionment shall be drawn so as most to burden Party X’s rights
to fair and effective representation.”132 The former map would obviously be
fair and permissible, the latter obviously not. As we move inward from these
poles, however, we begin to lose the determinacy of their example. And
somewhere in the middle, as Justice Scalia clearly sensed, we lose all assurance
of judgment. Claims of excessive redistricting partisanship sit squarely within
this soritical no-man’s land.
The upshot is that any effort to draw a precise line separating constitutional
and unconstitutional gerrymanders using imprecise terms like excessive will
inevitably end in paradox. If some minimal quantum of partisanship is
permitted, and we’ve already established that it is, then wouldn’t just a little bit
more partisanship also be permitted? And conversely, if some amount of
partisanship is prohibited, then wouldn’t just a little bit less partisanship also
be prohibited? And so on, in either direction, just as with the stone examples
presented above. It seems that we cannot point to a single stone separating
heaps and non-heaps; similarly, we cannot point to a single quantum of partisan
bias—even if it were precisely measurable—separating permissible from
excessive partisanship in redistricting. On this score, Justice Scalia was
absolutely right. Blunt terms don’t cut fine lines. How, then, are we supposed
to sort redistricting plans into those that are constitutional and those that are
not? This, slightly rephrased, is the central problem and dilemma of partisan
gerrymander review as understood by the Court thus far.133

131. READ, supra note 127, at 175.
132. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 312 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2504 (2019) (insisting on a “standard for
separating constitutional from unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering”).
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Unpacking the central problem posed by partisan gerrymander review, we
can see why the Court ended up where it did. For those Justices rejecting
justiciability, the perceived institutional injury that would result from judicial
trespass on political affairs was simply too powerful to allow for any margin of
error in answering the central problem. So, for them, a clear and precise
solution was indispensable. Yet, by insisting on precision, the Court was—by
its own admission134—caught in an “unanswerable” paradox.135
As Section II was intended to make clear, the growing evils of partisan
gerrymandering demand correction, but as this Section III has shown, a precise
judicial drawing-line will remain elusive.136 We began with Justice Scalia’s
formulation of the central problem facing the courts, which steered us into
paradox. But if the question is problematic and the answers untenable, we
should ask a better question. Rather than inquiring about substantive
redistricting standards, perhaps we should instead investigate the redistricting
process. I will elaborate at length on that suggestion in Section V, but I turn
next to lay some preliminary groundwork showing that such an endeavor is
worthwhile even after Rucho.
IV. MOVING FORWARD AFTER RUCHO
So, does Rucho mark the end of partisan gerrymander review by the federal
courts, forever? Not necessarily. To state the obvious, the Court could change
its mind. Should circumstances change—that is, should the evils of partisan
gerrymandering become more widespread and conspicuous, and should
alternative avenues for redistricting reform prove fruitless—the Court may elect
to revisit the issue. To that end, citizens, political scientists, and lawyers should
continue to mind the measurable political effects of Rucho. I expect there will
be some.
In any event, Rucho’s precedential value is delimited by the Court’s
reasoning—its ratio decidendi—on the facts presented in that case.137 Recall
that in Rucho the Court concluded partisan gerrymandering challenges under
the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment fall short of the
justiciability test.138 That is what Rucho stands for.
134. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 296–97 (Scalia, J.).
135. By contrast, those Justices supporting justiciability recognized that the problem itself does
not demand precision, so for them there was no need to go looking for it—particularly in light of the
injury at issue. In other words, the pernicious effects of partisan gerrymandering were grave enough
to justify an inexact, standards-based solution tolerating a measure of uncertainty at the boundaries and
even occasional judicial error, a risk that the courts could be trusted to manage within a narrow margin.
They would have avoided the paradox by recalibrating the inquiry. See, e.g., supra note 89.
136. See discussion Infra Sections II and III.
137. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1404 (2020).
138. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491, 2508.
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I suggest the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a
viable alternative. The Court has not yet ruled out a procedural due process
challenge to partisan gerrymandering—not in Rucho, nor in its prior partisan
gerrymandering cases. That means that, insofar as a procedural due process
challenge satisfies the Court’s justiciability conditions, it would not be
foreclosed by Rucho’s holding. Examining whether judicial review under the
Due Process Clause measures up will be the focus of the remainder of this
Article. In the end, I conclude that it does.
To recapitulate what has been said so far and transition to what follows—
partisan gerrymandering presents a very real challenge to democratic
governance and there is good reason to believe that wide-ranging reform will
not be soon forthcoming from other institutional corners. Accordingly, the
federal courts should have an important role to play in checking, or at least
inhibiting, the very worst abuses. That role was seemingly blocked by the Court
in Rucho. Confronted with a sorites paradox in its attempt to determine a
permissible measure of districting partisanship under the Equal Protection
Clause and First Amendment, the Court was unable to discern a judicial
solution and disclaimed involvement. But, properly understood, Rucho
established parameters for, rather than an absolute prohibition on, judicial
review going forward. I believe that challenges to partisan gerrymandering
asserted under the Due Process Clause fall squarely within those parameters.
V. A PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS SOLUTION
A. A Plausible Basis for Judicial Review
The first prerequisite to partisan gerrymander review under Rucho is to
identify a “plausible grant of authority in the Constitution.”139 In this Section,
I will argue that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—
specifically, its guarantee of safeguarding procedures—provides such a basis.
Procedural due process requires that the government abide by certain
minimal procedures, including notice and some form of hearing, when it
deprives persons of substantive rights.140 The right to vote is a constitutionally
protected right and, as the Court’s voting-rights jurisprudence makes clear,
partisan gerrymanders deny that right insofar as they dilute it.141 Such
deprivation, I maintain, implicates the procedural guarantee of the Due Process
Clause. Further, after a short primer, I end this Section by concluding that the

139. Id. at 2507.
140. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–65 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
332 (1976); Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507, 528–29; 533 (2004).
141. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 566 (1964).
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text and purpose of the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses, together with
certain of the Court’s precedents, support the notion that partisan gerrymanders
are adjudicative—rather than legislative—acts, and therefore demand enhanced
procedural safeguards.
i. Due Process Generally
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “No State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”142 At its core,
the concept of due process is animated by the recognition that sometimes
government goes astray—either through arbitrary abuses of power143 or through
erroneous decision making144—and the concomitant wish to avoid the perils
that follow.
With this purpose in mind, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause has been operationalized to encompass two complementary aspects—
substantive and procedural.145 Substantive due process guarantees certain
fundamental rights, including those enumerated in the Bill of Rights,146 and it
limits the government’s power to intrude on those rights “regardless of the
fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”147 It does so by requiring
that all government action be sufficiently justified,148 and its most stringent
applications underwrite some of the modern Court’s civil-rights
jurisprudence.149 By contrast, procedural due process presupposes substantive
rights but does not purport to define them. It is, instead, a guarantee of fair
procedure only. “In a procedural due process claim, it is not the deprivation of

142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
143. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (“Since the time of our early
explanations of due process, we have understood the core of the concept to be protection against
arbitrary action.”); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (“[H]istory reflects the traditional
and common-sense notion that the Due Process Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta . . . was
‘intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government,’ . . . [and]
to prevent governmental power from being ‘used for purposes of oppression.’”) (citations omitted).
144. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (“[A] primary function of legal process is to
minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.”); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (“Procedural
due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or
unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,
366 (1963) (“Experience teaches, however, that the affording of procedural safeguards, which by their
nature serve to illuminate the underlying facts, in itself often operates to prevent erroneous decisions
on the merits from occurring.”).
145. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
125–27 (1990).
146. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 663 (2015).
147. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331.
148. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999).
149. See generally id.; see also Joshua D. Hawley, The Intellectual Origins of (Modern)
Substantive Due Process, 93 TEX. L.R. 275, 322–40 (2014).
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property or liberty that is unconstitutional; it is the deprivation of property or
liberty without due process of law—without adequate procedures.”150
ii. Procedural Due Process
The doctrine of substantive due process has served as launching pad for
arguments urging stronger protections of individual liberties, but my focus in
this Article will be on procedural due process alone. The significance of
procedural due process should not be discounted. After all, it is “procedural
due process that is our fundamental guarantee of fairness, our protection against
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable government action.”151 Fair procedure,
in a word, “marks much of the difference between rule by law and rule by
fiat.”152 It is an important premise of this Article that, as a fundamental tenet
of our system of government, the demands of procedural due process must pilot
any and all government action that works a deprivation.
A constitutional procedural due process violation occurs when the
government deprives a person of life, liberty or property without appropriate
procedural safeguards.153 As a general concept whose prescriptions affix to any
government deprivation, the constitutional right to procedural due process “is
‘absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant’s
substantive assertions.”154 Importantly, however, the analytic framework is
flexible—the appropriate form and measure of process is calibrated to the
circumstances at issue.155 I will circle back to this key point later.
But there is a constitutional floor—at minimum, constitutional procedural
due process requires the affected parties be notified and given an opportunity
to avoid the threatened deprivation through a hearing held “at a meaningful time
and in a meaningfulmanner.”156 A trial-like hearing is not required in every
case, or even in most cases, as “the formality and procedural requisites for the

150. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
151. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971).
153. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
154. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978).
155. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.”) (quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972)).
156. Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); accord Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (“[T]here can be no doubt that at a
minimum [the Due Process Clause] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”);
Roth, 408 U.S. at 570 n.7 (“[I]t is fundamental that except in emergency . . . due process requires that
when a State seeks to terminate (a protected) interest . . . it must afford ‘notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case’ before the termination becomes effective.”) (quoting Bell
v. Burson 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971)).
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hearing [will] vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved
and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.”157 But traditional elements of a
fair hearing include the right to appear, to contest the government’s decision,
and to review and rebut the basis of the decision, all before a neutral
decisionmaker.158
The demands of procedural due process are triggered only when the
government threatens a protected interest, but once that initial showing is made,
courts must then determine what procedures are appropriate to guard against an
unlawful deprivation. In that regard, courts apply the balancing test set out by
the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.159 Under Mathews, a reviewing
court must formulate and tailor neutral procedures to meet the circumstances
upon consideration of (1) the private interest at stake, (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation through the procedures used and the value of additional procedures,
and (3) the government’s interest, including the burdens of additional
procedural requirements.160
iii. Procedural Due Process and Partisan Gerrymandering
Partisan gerrymandering deprives certain individuals of a constitutionally
protected interest—specifically, the full-value of the right to vote—and
therefore implicates the demands of procedural due process. As discussed
above, the right to vote is fundamental. Moreover, the right to vote is more
than a ballot formality; instead, the Constitution guarantees to every eligible
citizen a vote of equal worth and dignity.161 Partisan gerrymanders effectively
discount the value of certain votes by diluting their strength. Such dilution
“reduce[s] the weight of certain citizens’ votes, and thereby deprive[s] them of
their capacity to ‘fully and effectively participate in the political process.’”162
Moreover, it is firmly established that the right to vote “can be denied by a
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by
wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”163 Simply put, then,
partisan gerrymanders affect a constitutionally protected right and they deprive
that right insofar as they devalue it. The question is, given the constitutional

157. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.8 (quoting Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971)).
158. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333–34; Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
159. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35; see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529.
160. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
161. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8
(1964).
162. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2514 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565) (alterations omitted).
163. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555; accord Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2514 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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deprivation at issue, what is the appropriate form and measure of process that
is due?
iv. The Legislative Process as Procedural Due Process
When a legislature enacts generally applicable laws, affected parties
generally are not entitled to procedural due process beyond the lawmaking
process itself. That much is clear.164 But when a legislature does otherwise—
for example, by targeting individuals or identifiable groups—due process may
require something more. This distinction is critical, serving as the fulcrum on
which my argument ultimately turns.
Let’s start with traditional legislation. To illustrate the general principle, in
Townsend v. Yeomans,165 the Court denied a constitutional procedural due
process claim brought by tobacco warehousemen in Georgia because the
challenged government action—a state statute fixing maximum warehouse
fees—was a generally applicable law. The warehousemen in Townsend alleged
that the state legislature deprived them of economic profits without adequate
procedural safeguards because it had adopted the statute at issue without first
conducting appropriate investigation into the tobacco market or the economic
impact of the measure.166 The Court rejected the challenge. It explained:
There is no principle of constitutional law which nullifies
action taken by a legislature, otherwise competent, in the
absence of a special investigation. The result of particular
legislative inquiries through commissions or otherwise may be
most helpful in portraying the exigencies to which the
legislative action has been addressed and in fortifying
conclusions as to reasonableness . . . . But the Legislature,
acting within its sphere, is presumed to know the needs of the
people of the state. Whether or not special inquiries should be
made is a matter for the legislative discretion.167
In other words, insofar as the state legislature had acted “within its
sphere”—that is, by making generally applicable laws—it could act to deprive
the rights of certain individuals without any further process beyond the
lawmaking process itself.
Although the government actor in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State
Board of Equalization168 was a state agency rather than a state legislature, the
controlling principle was the same. In Bi-Metallic, a landowner in the City of
164. See, e.g., Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 n.32 (1985) (collecting cases); RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 3 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 17.8(c) (5th ed. 2020).
165. Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 451 (1937).
166. Id.
167. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omissions).
168. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
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Denver challenged an order of the Colorado State Board of Equalization
increasing the valuation of all taxable property in the City.169 The landowner
charged the Board with violating constitutional procedural due process
protections because it did not give him an opportunity to be heard before the
tax order was issued.170 Because the order was generally applicable, however,
the Court held that constitutional procedural due process did not require a
hearing.171 Notably, the Court assumed that “the proper state machinery ha[d]
been used” and that, with respect to the challenged tax order, all affected
landowners “st[ood] alike.”172 On those assumptions—that is, that the
challenged order was generally applicable and the lawmaking process itself was
not suspect—the Court concluded that any affected parties were “protected in
the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate
or remote, over those who make the rule.”173 In other words, in the absence of
individualized determinations, the Court concluded that the democratic
legislative process was, per se, due process.174 Generally applicable laws, the
Court explained, “affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the
point of ruin,”175 but that alone is not reason enough to augment the lawmaking
process.
Townsend and Bi-Metallic stand for the proposition that when state
legislatures or their administrative delegates adopt generally applicable
measures—i.e., when they legislate—no further process is required beyond the
lawmaking process itself, even if certain individuals suffer the loss of protected
interests. Legislatures are presumed, in a representative democracy, to
represent the interests of the people. That means that the interests of the
people—including their constitutionally protected interests—are pressed and
assayed by proxy as part of the political give-and-take that occurs when
legislatures make law. Insofar as the result is a generally applicable law, no
further process is required.
Importantly, however, the idea that the legislative process constitutes due
process is not absolute.
When a legislature makes particularized
determinations, targeting the law’s application to individuals or groups based
on facts and characteristics unique to those affected, it breaches the divide
between legislative and adjudicative action and its lawmaking process is no
longer insulated from constitutional augmentation.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 443.
Id. at 444.
Id. at 445–46.
Id. at 445.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The line between legislative and adjudicative acts is neither clean nor
absolute,176 but understanding has coalesced around the following basic
hallmarks: legislative action is generally applicable and addresses prospective
conduct; adjudicative action is partial and targets certain individuals or groups
on the basis of past or existing conduct or characteristics.177 As we’ve seen,
when a legislature makes generally applicable laws, the lawmaking process is
sufficient.178 On other hand, when a legislature instead targets the law to
specific persons or groups, the affected individuals “may be entitled to
procedural due process above and beyond that which already has been
provided” by the lawmaking process.179
In order to flesh out the important distinction between legislative and
adjudicative acts, I will briefly survey its history. As I make my case, it will be
important to understand why the distinction was strictly drawn in American
government charters, including the U.S. Constitution.
A historical
understanding will aid us in applying it to the issue of partisan gerrymanders.
v. Legislation v. Adjudication
1. History of the Distinction as Separation of Powers
Americans separated legislative and adjudicative actions in significant part
to defend and preserve the supremacy of due process guarantees against
transgression by overzealous legislatures keen on depriving individual rights,
starting with Parliament.180 During the colonial period, Parliament was “the
highest court in the land and the final expositor of the content of the law of the
land.”181 Moreover, Parliament “directly adjudicated a wide range of legal
176. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 164, § 17.8(c) (“The line between rulemaking and
adjudication is not at all clear.”); accord L C & S, Inc. v. Warren Cnty. Area Plan Comm’n, 244 F.3d
601, 603 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Unfortunately the line between legislation and adjudication is not always
easy to draw.”).
177. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers,
121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1731–34 (2012); ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 164, § 17.8(c) (“When an
agency promulgates generalized rules there is no constitutional right to a hearing for a specific
individual. However when the agency makes rules that might be termed adjudicative in that they affect
a very defined group of interests, then persons representing those interests should be granted some fair
procedure to safeguard their life, liberty or property.”); accord United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,
446 (1965) (“[T]he Framers of the Constitution sought to guard against such dangers [as legislative
prosecution] by limiting legislatures to the task of rule-making. ‘It is the peculiar province of the
legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules to
individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other departments.’”) (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810)); 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami–Dade Cnty., Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th
Cir. 2003).
178. See Bi–Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445–46; Townsend, 301 U.S. at 451.
179. 75 Acres, LLC, 338 F.3d at 1294.
180. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 177, at 1699–1703.
181. Id. at 1693.
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disputes between British parties, and adjudicated a number of matters as the
sole judge of the law and customs of Parliament.”182 With this melding of
functions, Parliament not only made the law but could also apply it unilaterally
across a range of contexts to deprive subjects of rights without common law
procedures.183 When Parliament exercised its broad sovereign prerogative
against the colonies, Americans famously decried the lack of representation in
Parliament.184 But, importantly and directly relevant to the current discussion,
they also argued that Parliament violated due process when it passed laws
depriving them of rights without a hearing.185 These complaints were closely
intertwined in the colonial lament that Americans lacked a political voice in
Parliament—that is, they lacked representation on the front end (legislation)
and due process on the back end (adjudication) of Parliament’s actions.186
Particularly instructive of American attitudes in the founding era is the
colonial reaction to the Coercive Acts passed by Parliament in the lead up to
the Revolutionary War. In 1774, Parliament passed the Coercive Acts to punish
Massachusetts for the Boston Tea Party, which had taken place the prior year.187
In the familiar retelling of that event, a group of Americans boarded merchant
vessels in Boston Harbor and dumped several hundred chests of tea owned by
the East India Company overboard, as a symbolic act of resistance to British
taxing measures.188 Among other things, the Coercive Acts closed Boston
Harbor until the inhabitants of Boston repaid the East India Company for its
losses.189 For the colonists, there would be no trial, no jury, no impartial
adjudicator—in a word, no procedural due process. In response, colonists
complained that, by pretermitting any trial requiring proof of liability and
damages, the judgment imposed by the Coercive Acts amounted to “a
legislative usurpation of the essentia[l] judicial function of resolving a legal
dispute between two parties.”190
The Coercive Acts also sought to prevent similar re-occurrences by altering
the terms of the Massachusetts Charter to wrest control from colonists in favor

182. Id. at 1693–94.
183. Id. at 1694.
184. See Judge Grant Dorfman, The Founders’ Legal Case: “No Taxation Without
Representation” Versus Taxation No Tyranny, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1377, 1378–79 (2008); Thomas C.
Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought,
30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 870 (1978).
185. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 177, at 1694, 1699–1703.
186. Id. at 1694.
187. Id. at 1700; See David B. Kopel, How the British Gun Control Program Precipitated the
American Revolution, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 283, 287 (2012).
188. See, e.g., id.
189. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 177, at 1700.
190. Id.
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of the Crown.191 Specifically, Parliament replaced Massachusetts’s elected
council with a Crown-appointed governor, granted judicial appointment
authority to that governor, and gave governor-appointed sheriffs the authority
to appoint juries.192 Colonists were incensed as Parliament altered their form
of government and stripped them of certain chartered liberties, again without
any opportunity to be heard on the matter.193 Even Parliament, colonists
insisted, was duty-bound to respect the procedural guarantees of due process.
194

The colonists’ deep distrust of Parliament engendered by these, and other
events bubbled over into their early approaches to self-governance.195 Prime
among the political innovations of the new nation were two features devised to
prevent the type of abuses committed by Parliament in the Revolutionary
period, and subsequently confirmed by the actions of local legislatures in the
earliest experiments with independent American state governments.
First, Americans adopted supra-legislative written constitutions founded on
the idea of popular—as opposed to legislative—sovereignty.196 After some
early missteps with state constitutions that provided few checks on legislative
power, Americans throughout the colonies recognized that, much like
Parliament had done before, “faction-ridden, unchecked state legislatures” were
prone to tread on private rights.197 Legislatures had to be constrained by law,
and supra-legislative written constitutions—ratified directly by the people
themselves—were conceived to that end.198
Second, early Americans insisted on the structural separation of
government powers.199 Having witnessed the abuses of corporate unification
of legislative and adjudicative government functions in Parliament and early
state assemblies, Americans sought to fracture control by cleaving the functions
of government into discrete and independent executive, legislative, and judicial
institutions.200 Legislatures would be vested with authority to make general
laws, and an independent judiciary would be tasked with applying it to specific
persons. The effect of these innovations was to corner legislatures by design,

191. See id. at 1701.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 1701–03.
195. See id. at 1703–06.
196. See id. at 1704–05.
197. Id. at 1704; see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 59–60
(2005).
198. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 177, at 1704–05; see AMAR, supra note 197, at
105–06, 211.
199. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 177, at 1705; see AMAR, supra note 197, at 59–64.
200. See AMAR, supra note 197, at 59–64.
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with supra-legislative constraints on one side and an independent judiciary on
the other, thus channeling legislative discretion principally into generally
applicable legislative—as opposed to targeted adjudicative—actions. 201
The principle of separation of powers was constitutionalized in most
American charters following independence, including the U.S. Constitution.202
For example, the U.S. Constitution assigns the legislative, executive, and
judicial functions of the federal government to separate and independent
institutions, governed by Articles I, II, and III, respectively.203 Moreover,
Article I delimits all American legislative powers—including those exercised
by Congress and state legislatures—with express prohibitions on bills of
attainder and ex post facto laws.204 Bills of attainder are laws that direct
punishment on a specific person or group without trial,205 while ex post facto
laws apply retroactively to punish past acts.206 Ostensibly legislative, bills of
attainder and ex post facto laws both operate adjudicatively, and therein lies the
problem. They do not establish general rules of conduct but instead target
particular individuals or groups for legal punishment. And they were
commonly weaponized by Parliament as a political tactic to subvert due process
and punish opponents without trial.207 Early Americans had taken notice—even
before the Constitution completely banned such “legislative trickery,” many
states had already done so.208 And the Framers thought them evil enough to
expressly prohibit them at any level of government.

201. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 177, at 1703–06; AMAR, supra note 197, at 63–64.
202. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 177, at 1705–06; AMAR, supra note 197, at 59–64.
203. U.S. CONST. art. I, II, III.
204. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.”); see
Chapman & McConnell, supra note 177, at 1717–19.
205. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 164, § 15.9(c) (“A bill of attainder is a legislatively
declared punishment (often with a legislative finding of guilt regarding some crime or activity) for
certain specific individuals. A bill of attainder may name the individuals or it may describe a class of
persons subject to punishment because of specific conduct when in effect the description of that
conduct operates to designate particular persons.”); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315–16
(1946) (“[N]o matter what their form, [legislative acts] that apply either to named individuals or to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a
judicial trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution.”).
206. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 164, § 15.9(b)(i) (“An ex post facto law is a measure
that imposes criminal liability on past transactions . . . . An ex post facto clause violation involves both
a change to substantive law and the application of the changed law to a particular defendant.”); See
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990) (“[A]ny statute which punishes as a crime an act
previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment
for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available
according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.”) (quoting
Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169–70 (1925)).
207. See AMAR, supra note 197, at 125.
208. See id.
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The structural separation and assignment of government powers between
independent institutions, together with the related prohibitions on particularly
egregious breaches of that separation in the form of bills of attainder and ex
post facto laws, as Professor Akhil Reed Amar has explained, “reflected a
strong commitment to the ideal that legislation, at least if punitive, should be
general and prospective. Otherwise, a legislature could simply impose
penalties upon political opponents by name, and no one, howsoever virtuous
their conduct, would be safe.”209
When the Fifth Amendment was ratified in 1791 it put a finer point on what
was already implicit in the existing constitutional structure by expressly
providing that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”210 And consistent with the structurally expressed
understanding of the Framers, the history of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause shows that it too was broadly conceived as “a limit on the
powers of all three branches”211 of the federal government. It was not
conceived simply as a formal limit on certain enforcement proceedings. It was,
instead, a fundamental sovereign mandate as broad as the problem it was
intended to address, guaranteeing that all government deprivations comport
with basic procedural fairness.
That mandate was extended in full to state legislatures after the Civil War
via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.212 The Civil War and
Reconstruction Amendments that followed dramatically re-worked the
American constitutional scheme of government, but “[t]he basic idea of due
process, both at the Founding and at the time of adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, was that the law of the land required each branch of government
to operate in a distinctive manner, at least when the effect was to deprive a
person of liberty or property.”213
Thus, the notion of due process was historically conceived in broad terms
to interpose fair procedures between the law as generally promulgated and as
specified to particular individuals or groups in connection with the deprivation
of protected interests. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, with their
209. Id. at 124; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 90 (1980) (“The Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses prove on analysis to be separation
of powers provisions, enjoining the legislature to act prospectively and by general rule (just as the
judiciary is implicitly enjoined by Article III to act retrospectively and by specific decree).”).
210. U.S. CONST., amend. V; see Chapman & McConnell, supra note 177, at 1717–18; AMAR,
supra note 197, at 63–64, 329–30.
211. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 177, at 1721 (emphasis added); see AMAR, supra note
197, at 316, 329–30.
212. U.S. CONST., amend XIV; see Chapman & McConnell, supra note 177, at 1726–27; AMAR,
supra note 197, at 385–89.
213. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 177, at 1781.
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respective guarantees of “due process of law,” made express—first with respect
to the federal government and then to state governments—what was implicit in
the Constitution’s structural design from the beginning: all persons are
guaranteed due process protections against government deprivations,
including—even particularly—those threatened by the legislature.
2. Cases—Direct and Indirect Application of Procedural Due Process to
Legislatures
The historical sketch above shows that early Americans conceived of due
process as a fundamental procedural safeguard against private deprivations
threatened by any institution of government. I will now survey a series of
Supreme Court cases that have carried that conception forward in practice,
specifically to legislatures.
These cases further underscore the distinction between legislative and
adjudicative government functions and confirm the point I’ve repeated
throughout this Section—namely, that legislatures must respect procedural due
process guarantees when they target and deprive particular persons or groups
of protected interests. There are two general types of cases I will review. First
are those where the Court has held the requirements of constitutional procedural
due process are directly implicated when a legislature acts. The second type of
case implicates procedural due process indirectly via the Court’s review of bills
of attainder and ex post facto laws. As we saw above, the constitutional
prohibition on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws are of a piece with the
Framers’ intent to preserve due process protections through the deliberate
bifurcation of legislative and adjudicative functions.
a. Direct Cases
The first case for consideration is Londoner v. Denver,214 in which the Court
reviewed a challenge to a local tax ordinance. The city council of Denver
approved an ordinance imposing a tax assessment on certain real property
abutting road improvements. Prior to approval, city officials published notice
of the proposed assessment to which several landowners filed objections.
However, without a hearing on the landowners’ objections, the City approved
the assessment. The landowners filed suit alleging the tax ordinance violated
procedural due process. Notably, unlike the general tax valuation increase at
issue in Bi-Metallic discussed earlier,215 the ordinance in Londoner was not an
across-the-board measure; instead, it levied a tax on a limited subset of

214. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
215. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445–46 (1915).
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landowners.216 The tax assessment thus operated as an adjudication because
the measure itself “determine[ed] whether, in what amount, and upon whom it
shall be levied.”217 For that reason, the Court sided with the landowners and
voided the tax assessment, concluding that “due process of law requires that at
some stage of the proceedings, before [a particularized deprivation occurs], [an
individual affected by the action] shall have an opportunity to be heard, of
which he must have notice, either personal, by publication, or by a law fixing
the time and place of the hearing.”218
The Court reached a similar result under very different circumstances in
Groppi v. Leslie,219 which concerned a contempt resolution adopted by the
Wisconsin State Assembly. In Groppi, the Court held the State Assembly
violated procedural due process when it punished the petitioner, a protestor who
led an “occupation” of the Assembly floor to protest state welfare budget
cuts.220 Shortly after the petitioner’s initial arrest and confinement, the
Assembly passed a contempt resolution ordering him confined in jail for up to
six months.221 Although he was served with notice of the resolution in jail, he
was not given an opportunity to rebut the resolution before its adoption.222 He
alleged the denial of procedural due process, and the Court agreed.223 The Court
conceded that the Assembly had the authority to punish the petitioner for his
actions.224 But the question before the Court was what procedures were
required by the Due Process Clause beforehand.225 The Court noted “the
panoply of procedural rights that are accorded a defendant in a criminal trial”
were not required in every circumstance; nevertheless, the Court stressed that
“reasonable notice of a charge and an opportunity to be heard in defense before
punishment is imposed are ‘basic in our system of jurisprudence.’”226 The
Court construed the contempt resolution as an adjudicative act because it
targeted a specific individual for punishment, and given the nature of the act,
the Court held that procedural due process required a “hearing appropriate to
the nature of the case.”227

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Londoner, 210 U.S. at 380–86.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 385–86.
Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972).
Id. at 498.
Id. at 496–97.
Id. at 498–99.
Id. at 498–507.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 500.
Id. at 501–02 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)).
Id. at 503, 507.
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b. Indirect Cases
As explained above, bills of attainder and ex post facto laws were two
particularly egregious forms of legislative rifling expressly forbidden under the
Constitution to avoid targeted legal punishments. And the universal ban on
these measures further enforced the separation of powers drawn by the
independent assignment of legislative and adjudicative functions. That
structural separation, properly understood in tandem with the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, was framed in significant
part to ensure that legislatures comport with supra-legislative procedural
safeguards. When called on to review bills of attainder and ex post facto laws,
the Court has made these points plain.
For example, in U.S. v. Brown,228 the Court reviewed the constitutionality
of a provision of the Labor-Management Report and Disclosure Act of 1959
(the “Act”), which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to
serve as an officer or employee of a labor union. An “open and avowed”
Communist was elected to the board of a local labor union and subsequently
indicted for violation of the Act. He was convicted following a jury trial, but
appealed and alleged, among other things, that the provision at issue violated
the constitutional ban on bills of attainder.229 The Court agreed.230 The
constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder, the Court explained, was one of
multiple related “barriers . . . erected to ensure that the legislature would not
overstep the bounds of its authority and perform the functions of the other
departments.”231 With the history of Parliament’s use and abuse as backdrop,
the constitutional ban on bills of attainder “was intended not as a narrow,
technical . . . prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the separation of
powers, a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function,
or more simply—trial by legislature.”232 The constitutional prohibition on bills
of attainder was intended, in short, to bar “legislative punishment, of any form
or severity, of specifically designated persons or groups.”233 The trouble with
the Act, the Court concluded, was that it did not prospectively criminalize
certain conduct through a generally applicable measure, but instead specified
punishment to “easily ascertainable members of a group.”234

228. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 438 (1965).
229. Id. at 437.
230. Id. at 461–62.
231. Id. at 444 (citing The Federalist, No. 48, pp. 383–84 (Hamilton ed. 1880) (Madison))
(emphasis omitted).
232. Id. at 442.
233. Id. at 447.
234. Id. 448–49.
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The Court struck many of the same chords decades earlier in Cummings v.
Missouri,235 when it examined the constitutionality of certain provisions of the
Missouri constitution of 1865, which imposed a loyalty oath as precondition to,
among other things, voting, holding public office, practicing law, or acting as a
teacher or religious official in the State. The Court invalidated the loyalty oath
as both a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law.236 In reaching this
conclusion, Justice Field, writing for the Court, traced the origin and rationale
for their constitutional prohibition. His discourse is illuminating, providing
further depth on these measures and the broader topic of separation of powers
that will aid us later in determining whether partisan gerrymanders are
legislative or adjudicative acts.
Field defined a bill of attainder as “a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without a judicial trial”—that is, an instance where “the legislative
body . . . exercises the powers and office of judge” by targeting punishment on
specific persons or groups.237 Bills of attainder might be directed against
individuals or “against a whole class,”238 but in either case the distinctive vice
of such bills is the scope of application—partial and targeted rather than
generally applicable. Importantly, on the issue of punishment, Field concluded
that legal punishment properly understood was punishment broadly
understood, “embracing deprivation or suspension of [any] political or civil
rights.”239
Moreover, Field clarified that bills of attainder might inflict punishment
absolutely or conditionally—for example, by confiscating property or, less
obviously, by requiring “expurgatory oath[s]” as a precondition to the exercise
of protected rights.240 In any event, the defect in all such bills, at bottom, is that
they “creat[e] . . . deprivation[s] without any of the ordinary forms and guards
provided for the security of the citizen in the administration of justice.”241 The
legal disabilities imposed by the Missouri loyalty oath constituted legal
punishment against a subset of individuals; and because the Missouri
constitution imposed such punishment “without any of the forms or safeguards
of trial,” the Court found that it constituted an unlawful bill of attainder.242
Field reasoned similarly in concluding that the Missouri loyalty oath
likewise violated the Constitution’s prohibition on ex post facto laws.243 An ex
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Cummings v. Missouri 71 U.S. 277 (1866).
Id. at 325, 328–32.
Id. at 323.
Id.
Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
Id. at 325.
Id.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 328–32.
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post facto law is “one which imposes a punishment for an act [that] was not
punishable at the time it was committed.”244 The loyalty oaths at issue clearly
“aimed at past acts, and not future acts,” and therefore ran afoul of the
Constitution.245 Much like bills of attainder, Field explained, ex post facto laws
“assume that the parties are guilty; they call upon the parties to establish their
innocence; and they declare that such innocence can be shown only in one
way—by an inquisition, in the form of an expurgatory oath.”246
Legislatures may not determine that certain persons or groups are guilty and
target the law’s application accordingly, for to do otherwise is to adjudicate
rather than legislate, unlawfully circumventing the procedural safeguards
guaranteed by due process. That, in sum, is the lesson to be drawn from the
Constitution’s prohibition on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. Instead,
as Brown and Cummings make clear, when a legislature makes laws imposing
punishment it must do so by proscribing certain general conduct. It cannot, by
contrast, condition punishment on the past or present characteristics and
behavior of specific persons or groups.
vi. Recap of Plausibility
Taking stock of what has preceded, we may summarize as follows. The
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees that state
governments—inclusive of legislatures—must provide procedural safeguards
when depriving individuals of protected interests. However, those safeguards
are flexible. When a legislature enacts generally applicable law—that is, when
it acts legislatively—the lawmaking process itself is sufficient. But when a
legislature identifies persons or groups for punishment—that is, when the
legislature acts adjudicatively—due process demands more.
The structural separation of powers was framed to secure basic due process
protections by assigning oversight to a separate institution—namely, the
judiciary—interposed between lawmakers and subjects. Lessons from the
colonial and early post-Revolutionary period show that, absent such protection,
legislatures are prone to abuse their lawmaking powers to target political
opponents for punishment. Bills of attainder and ex post facto laws are
emblematic of the types of abuses the Framers sought to avoid by constitutional
design. Each consists of adjudication in the guise of legislation.
Bringing this understanding to bear on the issue of redistricting, I contend
that when a legislature adopts a partisan gerrymander it does not merely
establish a general and prospective law. Instead, it targets a subgroup of
244. Id. at 325–26.
245. Id. at 327.
246. Id. at 328.
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political opponents for legal punishment. To be sure, insofar as redistricting
simply governs district membership in the abstract (e.g., establishing, for
example, who belongs in the 14th district versus the 15th district), redistricting
is indeed general and prospective. Every citizen “stands alike” before a
redistricting plan in this regard. So, in this limited regard, the lawmaking
process alone is process enough under Townsend and Bi-Metallic. Nothing
further is required. But when the redistricting process is employed to target
political opponents, when it is used as a tool to dilute the votes of partisan
opponents, it ceases to be generally applicable and prospective. It ceases to be
legislative.
Partisan gerrymanders are not bills of attainder or ex post facto laws,247 but
they are a close cousin. They have a similar modus operandi, targeting
identifiable subsets of the population for legal punishment. The kinship is most
obvious in comparison with loyalty oaths, like the one at issue in Cummings.
Just as with other bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, loyalty oaths target
particular persons or groups for punishment. But loyalty oaths, like partisan
gerrymanders, employ a tactic of functional deception. They are insidious in
the following respect—they target by transmuting unique past or present
identifying facts about specific persons or groups into prospective and
ostensibly general behavior via the oath requirement. The target itself is the
same, but the approach is different.
Partisan gerrymanders target punishment—in the form of vote dilution—
against individuals based on unique identifying past (voting record) and present
(party membership) facts about the intended targets. When a partisan
gerrymander is adopted, the party in power does not say, in bald terms, that
opposition party voters are entitled only to a fraction of a full vote. That would
clearly be unlawful. So, rather than conditioning punishment directly and
expressly on identifying facts about the target, partisan gerrymanders—just like
loyalty oaths—condition punishment on the prospective failure to disavow
those facts. To borrow Justice Field’s words from Cummings with some
revision, partisan gerrymanders “assume that [opposition party voters] are
guilty; they call upon the [voters] to establish their innocence; and they declare
that such innocence can be shown only in one way—by an inquisition, in the
form of an expurgatory [vote].”248 With a loyalty oath, a right is conditioned
on a pledge of allegiance; with partisan gerrymanders, a right—specifically, the
right to a full-valued vote—is conditioned on a similar pledge, namely a vote
for the favored party on election day.

247. At least I am not here arguing as much.
248. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 328 (1866).
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Now, it might be argued in defense of partisan gerrymanders that because
the alleged deprivation is conditional, it is, in fact, no such thing. In other
words, opposition party voters can simply switch and vote for the favored party
and thereby avoid punishment. Every voter has a prospective choice; after all,
“[p]olitical affiliation is not an immutable characteristic,”249 and some voters
certainly do switch allegiances. But that truism misses the point. Individual
voting behavior is patterned and durable, a fact empirically demonstrated and
obviously presupposed by the practice of partisan gerrymandering itself. That
being the case, the opportunity for an individual to prospectively switch
allegiances in the voting booth to secure a full-valued vote does not remove the
dilutive sting of partisan gerrymandering nor, as we saw in Cummings, does the
conditional nature of the deprivation rescue its constitutionality. It is not
enough to say that a voter can avoid punishment by changing their vote to match
the legislature’s partisan preferences.
The upshot is that partisan gerrymandering: (i) targets a discrete, durable,
and clearly identifiable group of persons—specifically, political opponents; and
(ii) punishes members of that group by depriving them of a protected
constitutional interest in the form of vote dilution. Therefore, I contend,
partisan gerrymandering constitutes an adjudication—that is, not just a
deprivation, but an adjudicatory deprivation—and procedures beyond the
lawmaking process alone may be required under the Due Process Clause. I turn
to that matter next, reviewing partisan gerrymanders under the Mathews
balancing test set forth above.
B. Manageability of Judicial Standards
The overriding purpose of procedural due process, as noted earlier, is to
guard the individual against arbitrary government action. Courts are given wide
latitude in operationalizing such purpose on the understanding that “[t]he very
nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally
applicable to every imaginable situation.”250 The proper measure of process is
thus fixed in each case—rather than across cases—by examining the respective
private and government interests at stake under the framework articulated in
Mathews, which if you recall, requires comparative consideration of: (1) the
private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation given the existing
procedures and the value of additional procedures; and (3) the government’s
interest, including the burdens of additional procedural requirements.251

249. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287 (2004).
250. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473, AFL–CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961).
251. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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i. Nature and Weight of the Private Interest
The first Mathews factor to consider is the nature and weight of the private
interest at stake.
The private right implicated by partisan gerrymandering is the right to
vote— “a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.”252
Because this right’s heavy constitutional weight was discussed earlier, we need
not dwell here long. It should suffice to quote directly from the Court’s decision
in Reynolds, which announced the one-person, one-vote rule nearly six decades
ago. In reaching its decision, the Court described both the fundamental
character of the right to vote and the significant deprivation that results from its
devaluation through partisan gerrymandering:
Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the
right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in
federal elections. A consistent line of decisions by this Court
in cases involving attempts to deny or restrict the right of
suffrage has made this indelibly clear. It has been repeatedly
recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally
protected right to vote . . . . The right to vote freely for the
candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic
society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of
representative government. And the right of suffrage can be
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s
vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free
exercise of the franchise.253
The right to vote standing alone thus represents a powerful private interest,
but something further to consider in the balance is the indefinite length of the
harm that results from partisan gerrymandering. The gravity of a private
interest considered under Mathews compounds with the duration of its
deprivation.254 Vote dilution has no fixed expiration, and the potential
corrective of cyclical redistricting occurs infrequently. Moreover, the dilutive
effects on some voters may become entrenched because many of the distortive
political effects of partisan gerrymanders are durable and cannot be counted on
to ebb through regular political turnover—politics is a tumultuous sea with
irregular tides. In short, the fundamental constitutional importance of the right

252. Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
253. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S 533, 554–55 (1964) (citations omitted).
254. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (“The duration of any potentially wrongful
deprivation of a property interest is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the
private interest involved.”); Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975) (“[T]he possible length of
wrongful deprivation of . . . is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action on the
private interests.”).
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to vote and the indefinite length of its devaluation together weigh heavily on
the private interest side of the Mathews ledger.
ii. The Risk of Error and Value of Additional Procedures
The next Mathews factor to consider is the risk of erroneous deprivation
presented by existing procedures and the value of additional or alternative
procedural safeguards.
To start, we must gauge the existing risk of error. In the context of
redistricting, error consists of partisan excess. And, as things currently stand,
the risk of error is significant. To be sure, the process of redistricting is not
monolithic—it is a local state process with fifty different approaches, some
better than others. But baseline redistricting procedures, which are more often
than not entrusted exclusively to state legislatures, cannot be relied on to
produce consistently and reliably fair redistricting outcomes nationwide. That
risk is shown by the examples of North Carolina and Maryland, whose distorted
maps were at issue in Rucho,255 and the broader trend toward partisan extremity
which will no doubt be pushed by technological advances.
It is important to further consider that, by disclaiming justiciability, the
Court in Rucho removed one important barrier—or at least a limiting
principle—against partisan redistricting abuse: federal court review. The
power of such protection presumably eroded over time as review by the federal
courts proved to be a mostly empty threat. But until Rucho the prospect of
litigation and the threat of judicial review at least remained in principle, and we
might have expected the average legislature to discount its tendency to excess
by the odds of judicial reversal. Rucho collapsed the measure of that discount.
After Rucho, legislatures have even less reason to shield naked partisanship in
redistricting. The unabashed partisanship exhibited in North Carolina and
Maryland may become the new norm absent any federal judicial backstop.
Rucho’s disclaimer of federal justiciability compounded the risk of excessive
partisanship, and it is this enlarged post-Rucho risk that must be reckoned for
present purposes.
With that said, if current baseline legislative procedures cannot be trusted
to constrain this growing risk of partisan redistricting abuse, it seems intuitive
that additional procedures might do some good. But how so? To drill down a
bit—additional procedural safeguards can, as understood through the lens of

255. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491–93 (2019).
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Bayesian probability theory, bolster our confidence in redistricting outcomes
by serving as evidence to confirm or disconfirm partisan excess. 256
In other words, procedural fairness can be linked inferentially to
substantive fairness. To illustrate, let’s treat the constitutionality of a
redistricting plan as a hypothesis and, as such, presume at the outset that the
plan is probably fair. Next, let’s look at the procedures used to adopt that plan.
Our presumptive confidence in the plan’s fairness may go up or down
depending on the manner in which the plan was adopted. Now, if we assume
as a general matter that excessive partisan gerrymanders are less likely to bear
certain procedural hallmarks than the average fair redistricting plan—this is an
assumption, to be sure, but I think a reasonable one—then it follows, under
Bayesian principles, that evidence such procedures were actually employed
reduces the conditional probability that the districting map under review is
tainted.257 In short, evidence of fair procedures can bolster confidence in fair
outcomes. It’s that simple—and that is the key value of additional procedures.
The idea is that “when there is uncertainty about a hypothesis [in this case,
the constitutionality of a redistricting map], observational evidence can
sometimes raise or lower the probability of the hypothesis.”258 As relevant
here, I suggest that such observational evidence includes the procedural
mechanics of redistricting plan adoption. Critically, in reviewing such
procedural evidence, courts don’t have to say what a fair plan looks like—they
don’t have to answer Justice Scalia’s “unanswerable” question. Courts can
avoid the paradox. All they have to do, instead, is assume that the employment
of certain minimal procedures is more likely to be shared by fair plans than
unfair ones—whatever such plans might look like, and without parsing them.
What those procedural safeguards themselves should look like is a separate

256. See JAMES JOYCE, Bayes’ Theorem, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (rev.
2003); PETER GODFREY-SMITH, THEORY AND REALITY 202–18 (2003). In short, Bayesianism
provides a way of understanding (and calculating) how we update our beliefs in light of new evidence.
This allusion to Bayesianism is an important one, I think, but one that does not demand further
digression here. I will thus save the reader from the formula for Bayes’ theorem or an extended
discussion, both of which may be found in the cited sources.
257. Godfrey-Smith uses the following example to make the point:
Imagine you are unsure about whether someone is at a party. The hypothesis that
he is at the party is h. Then you see his car outside. This is evidence e. Suppose
that before seeing the car, you think the probability of his going to the party is
0.5. and the probability of his car’s being outside if he is at the party is 0.8,
because he usually drives to such events, while the probability of his car’s being
outside if he is not at the party is only 0.1. Then we can work out the probability
that he is at the party given that his car is outside. [According to Bayes’ formula],
seeing the car [strongly] confirms the hypothesis that the person is at the party.
GODFREY-SMITH, supra note 256, at 204.
258. Id. at 203.
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matter, one that is particularly well-suited to judicial review as will be discussed
below.
iii. Government Interests
Having noted the fundamental importance of the right to vote and the
ongoing risk of erroneous deprivation through partisan gerrymanders, along
with the evidentiary value of additional procedural safeguards, we must finally
consider the offsetting government interests under Mathews.
Balanced against the important private interests here are the state
government interests in preserving both autonomy—particularly with respect
to political processes—and the public purse. “[I]t is characteristic of our federal
system,” the Court has explained, “that States retain autonomy to establish their
own governmental processes.”259 This is an important countervailing interest,
sensitivity to which has figured prominently in the Court’s partisan
gerrymandering jurisprudence. For instance, in Rucho, the Court cautioned that
“[a]n important reason for those careful constraints [on the federal judiciary] is
that . . . ‘[t]he opportunity to control the drawing of electoral boundaries
through the legislative process of apportionment is a critical and traditional part
of the politics in the United States.’”260 A separate but related government
interest concerns conservation of public fiscal and administrative resources.
Recognizing government resources are finite, the Court has advised that any
benefit accruing to private interests from additional procedural requirements
must be considered in light of the general public interest in managing
“administrative burden[s] and other societal costs” that would be incurred upon
imposition of such requirements.261
Although the relevant state interests are powerful, in this context, the
surplus after offset under Mathews is on the private side. The Court must, for
good reason, be mindful of state autonomy—it is, after all, “[t]hrough the
structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise government
authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign.”262 However, heavy as the
government’s interest may be, state autonomy is not absolute.263 Indeed, state
autonomy is no more weighty an interest than other powerful government
interests the Court has considered and held must yield to accommodate the
259. Arizona State Legis. v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2673
(2015).
260. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2498 (2019) (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109, 145 (1986)).
261. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976).
262. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
263. See, e.g., Arizona State Legi., 135 S. Ct. at 2679 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“The States do
not . . . ‘retain autonomy to establish their own governmental processes,’ if those ‘processes’ violate
the United States Constitution.”).
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demands of constitutional minimums—for example, national security and the
regulation of foreign affairs.264
Moreover, the state government interest in autonomous political processes
is itself subsumed under a more capacious one—namely, the public’s interest
in governmental legitimacy. The separation of federal and state governments,
and likewise the separation of powers within each level of government, are
foundational principles conceived and implemented in our layered system of
government in order to preserve individual rights and institutional legitimacy.
State autonomy is not an end in itself but is instead the instrument of more
elementary ambitions. And those ambitions are advanced, rather than
frustrated, by guarding against the excesses of partisan gerrymandering. Pure
partisan interests are partial interests and, as such, should not be confused with
public interests simply because they bear the imprimatur of a numerical
majority on the assembly floor. This is especially true when, as is the risk with
partisan gerrymanders, such majority reflects districting ingenuity more sharply
than popular preferences. Because it is the public interest we are currently
concerned to articulate, I think it is relevant to mention recent polls show the
majority of Americans favor redistricting reform.265
As for the cost and administrative burden of additional procedural
safeguards, fiscal concerns are important but not controlling.266 They must of
course be considered in context, and on this point the Court has observed that
“[t]here can be no compromise on the footing of convenience or expediency, or
because of a natural desire to be rid of harassing delay, when that minimal [due
process] requirement has been neglected or ignored.”267 Additional procedural
safeguards would cost time and money, but there is no reason to believe the
cost would be prohibitive here. Indeed, some states currently mandate
redistricting procedures beyond the legislative process itself—including, for
example, the use of commissions, public hearings, and public reporting.268

264. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531–33 (2004) (holding that the exigencies of
ongoing combat do not override minimum due process protections); Kennedy v. Mendoza–Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 164–65 (1963) (“It is fundamental that the great powers of Congress to conduct war and
to regulate the Nation’s foreign relations are subject to the constitutional requirements of due
process.”).
265. See Americans Are United Against Partisan Gerrymandering, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/americans-areunited-against-partisan-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/U6Y3-9J7R].
266. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (finding that an eligible recipient’s receipt
of public assistance outweighed the state’s competing interest in conserving fiscal and administrative
resources for due–process purposes).
267. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292, 305 (1937).
268. See 50 STATE GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING, supra note 9.
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iv. Demonstrating Manageability
The results of the preceding study under the Mathews formula are, by my
calculation, that there is a credit due on the side of private interests, which must
be balanced by additional procedural protections to guard against partisan
excess in redistricting. The present risk of such excess, compounded by
Rucho’s disclaimer of justiciability, is significant. And the value of additional
procedures consists in bolstering confidence in redistricting outcomes. Having
further made the case above that procedural review of partisan gerrymandering
is manageable, the task now is to show as much—to outline what kinds of
procedures would be appropriate in this context, fully recognizing that due
process jurisprudence is guided by both principle and practicalities.
Procedural requirements bend to circumstances but are rigid in essentials.
The basic rudiments include notice, some form of hearing and an impartial
decisionmaker.269 I will address each element in turn, offering loose
recommendations while noting the types of considerations that might inform
any constitutional determination.
The practical difficulties here are
significant—owing most acutely to the large number of affected individuals—
but those difficulties are offset by the fact that those individuals affected are
similarly situated. The formulation of procedural safeguards can accommodate
that reality.
1. Notice
The first element of constitutional due process is notice “reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.”270 Where individual interests are “identical with that of a class,”
however, notice need not be personally delivered in every case, as “notice
reasonably certain to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to
safeguard the interests of all.”271 In the context of redistricting, states may
legitimately consider costs and any corresponding administrative drain in
selecting the appropriate mix of traditional (e.g., mail, email, website,
269. See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (“Many
controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can
be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication
be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”); Marshall v.
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (“The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and
disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. This requirement of neutrality in adjudicative
proceedings safeguards the two central concerns of procedural due process, the prevention of
unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected
individuals in the decisionmaking process.”).
270. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
271. Id. at 319.
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newspapers, billboards, television, radio, etc.) and new mediums (e.g., social
media platforms like Facebook and Twitter) to utilize in delivering notice.272
Notice contents need not be lengthy, but should at minimum: (i) identify the
time and place of hearing(s) on the state’s proposed redistricting maps; and
(ii) direct recipients to a public website where copies of the proposed maps and
associated materials (discussed below) may be accessed. Notice should also be
given at least fourteen days in advance of the hearing(s) to provide affected
parties with sufficient time to arrange attendance and to meaningfully inspect
any proposed redistricting maps and accompanying materials.
2. Hearing
Next, due process requires “some form of hearing . . . before an individual
is finally deprived of a [protected] interest.”273 The formality and mechanics of
the hearing can vary—a trial-like hearing is not required, nor would it be
practicable to approximate one in this context.274 Given the large number of
affected individuals and the similarity of interests at stake, the legislature must
be given latitude to limit hearings—their number, duration, and content—on
the understanding that widespread notice and access will likely facilitate review
and comment at a sufficient level of competence to “safeguard the interests of
all.”275 This might mean, in practical terms, holding several hearings
throughout the state but limiting attendance and the in-person presentation of
testimony and evidence. Hearings should, however, be scheduled at times and
places that would be reasonably calculated to permit broad public attendance.
To maximize access and compensate for obvious limitations on in-person
participation, the hearings should be made available via live-streaming and
recording. Meanwhile, states should allow for the supplementation of in-person

272. Courts might take a cue from established caselaw regarding the sufficiency of class action
settlement notices under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1). Federal courts around the country
have developed guidelines to interpret and apply Rule 23’s general admonition that class notice must
be directed “in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound.” And in doing so, they
have had to consider practical challenges similar to those that would be presented by redistricting
notice. See, e.g., In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 999 F.3d 1247, 1259, 1284
(11th Cir. 2021) (approving an “innovative and comprehensive” settlement notice program designed
to reach nearly 150 million class members affected by a data breach, which included “multiple emails,
a social media campaign, newspaper and radio advertising, a settlement website, and a call center to
answer questions”).
273. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
274. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1970) (“The opportunity to be heard must be
tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.”).
275. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319; see also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972) (“[A]
weighing process has long been a part of any determination of the form of hearing required in particular
situations by procedural due process.”).
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testimony and evidence through online submissions via a publicly accessible
website.276
The central motivation of the hearing requirement, again, is to provide some
opportunity for the affected parties to meet the proposed deprivation before it
occurs. Public engagement through redistricting hearings will help to inform
mapmakers of the consequences of their decisions, which should, in turn,
reduce the likelihood of excess.
3. Impartiality
The last, and perhaps most challenging, procedural due process requirement
is ensuring the redistricting process is fair and impartial. Decision making
impartiality is key because, as the Court has explained:
The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty,
or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or
distorted conception of the facts or the law . . . . At the same
time, it preserves both the appearance and reality of
fairness . . . by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his
interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may
present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not
predisposed to find against him.277
The challenge with ensuring redistricting impartiality is a familiar one. On
the one hand, existing, unadulterated legislative redistricting processes are
inherently beset with conflicts of interest and the potential for partisan bias. On
the other hand, some measure of bias is expected and permitted. That being the
case, neutrality in this context must be qualified. The goal is not to eliminate
partisanship altogether, but instead to ensure that the redistricting process as a
whole is reasonably fair.
Anticipating an objection, fairness may seem an unfit legal criterion in light
of the sorites discussion in Section III. The search for fairness—that is, the
inverse of excess—in redistricting should sound familiar because it is precisely
the issue over which the Court repeatedly stumbled, as detailed above. There
is, however, a very important difference between the type of fairness that eluded
the Court in its decisions up to and including Rucho (i.e., substantive) and the
type of fairness I am now advocating (i.e., procedural). The key lies in legal
276. Model Legislation for Independent Redistricting Commissions, BRENNAN CENTER FOR
JUSTICE
(Dec.
12,
2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019–
12/2019_10_ModelBills_longtextFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG6S-MAJD], includes this and
many other valuable recommendations designed to improve the redistricting process. Of course, the
Brennan Center’s procedural recommendations are included in proposed model legislation, whereas I
am here arguing for the judicial imposition of certain redistricting procedures as a constitutional
mandate.
277. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (internal citations omissions).
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framing. By employing a procedural rather than substantive lens, the search for
redistricting fairness avoids the type of confusion that culminated in Rucho. A
sorites paradox arises in the first instance when we demand more precision than
our terms can accommodate. And, as we saw above, the reason partisan
gerrymander review proved so troublesome for the Court in the past was that
certain members of the Court—reviewing challenges under the rubric of the
Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment—insisted on a precise
substantive dividing line.278
However, a procedural approach to the issue should avoid similar
confusion. The reason being that the Court has explicitly recognized that
procedural due process, by its nature, will not submit to precise specification.
Instead, as noted above, “[i]t is axiomatic that due process ‘is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation [requires].’”279 In
other words, the Court’s own jurisprudence should steer judicial redistricting
review clear of the insistence on precisification that caused such difficulty for
the Court when it approached the issue substantively. Moreover, as I’ve noted,
procedural fairness—unlike its substantive counterpart—is squarely within the
judicial wheelhouse, requiring no special electoral or political expertise.280 The
Rucho Court wrote at length on its concern that federal courts are not wellequipped to make the kind of judgments regarding electoral fairness needed to
adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims.281 And, the Court added, the cost
of misplaced review would be widespread, clumsy, and unwelcome judicial
intrusion.282 That may be true enough. But even crediting Rucho’s concerns,
they need not be dispositive. They can, instead, be allayed by a flexible,
process-based approach.
Procedural review disclaims the problematic ambition for precision.
Accordingly, under procedural review, the redistricting process could be
assessed for impartiality by looking for indicia of fairness along several
procedural dimensions rather than a precise substantive dividing line. The list
of factors below is not intended to be exhaustive, and none should be

278. See discussion supra Section III.
279. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979) (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
280. See ELY, supra note 209, at 102 (noting that judges are “experts on process”); Jason Parkin,
Dialogic Due Process, 167 U. PENN. L. REV. 1115, 1122–23 (2019) (“Throughout American history,
the nation’s courts have been the arbiters of whether the government has provided due process of law
before depriving someone of ‘life, liberty, or property.’”); Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due
Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1890 (2016) (“In the textbooks, procedural due process is a strictly
judicial enterprise.”).
281. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2496–2508 (2019).
282. Id. at 2507–08.

MORRIS_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

836

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:787

dispositive, but the list illustrates the kinds of key process-related questions that
a reviewing court should ask and consider:
• Who drew the map? Even if not constitutionally required,
the employment of an independent commission (whether
as mapmaker or advisor) or independent mapmaking
consultants, would strongly signal impartiality. Other
related considerations could include the size, composition
and qualifications of the commission, along with provision
for independent funding.
• What criteria did the mapmaker consider, and how were
the criteria prioritized? The mapmaker should publish for
public inspection, along with its proposed map, the criteria
employed in the map’s creation. The express prioritization
of traditional redistricting criteria like equal population,
minority representation, compactness, contiguity, and
preservation of communities of interest, together with the
subordination or prohibition of partisan considerations
would indicate the process was sufficiently impartial.
• Did the mapmaker consider alternative maps as well as the
impact of the proposed map on, for example, partisan
efficiency, racial minorities, and communities of interest?
The widespread availability of mapmaking technology and
electoral data has made it easier than ever for citizens to
participate in the mapmaking process by creating and
submitting their own maps.
Moreover, the same
technology and data have also made it easier for
mapmakers to gauge the ramified impacts of redistricting
across categories, including but not limited to partisan
efficiency, racial minorities, and communities of interest.
Relevant to the question of impartiality would be evidence
that other alternative maps were considered and, if so,
explanations why the alternative maps were not selected.
• How was the map adopted? Impartiality might be further
evidenced by supermajority voting requirements by the
body—whether the legislature or an independent
commission—tasked with adopting the redistricting plan.
Actual bipartisan support for the proposed map, even in the
absence of supermajority voting requirements, would
likewise indicate procedural fairness.
• Did the final decisionmaker provide a statement of reasons
and evidence in support of the map? The ultimate
decisionmaker should supply a report both explaining its
reasons for adopting the final map and identifying the
evidence on which it relied in reaching its decision. The
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inclusion of a supporting report would go a long way
toward showing, notwithstanding the inscrutable motives
of those involved, that the decisionmaking process itself
was not arbitrary.
The above considerations are illustrative rather than prescriptive, intended
to identify the key process nodes that merit judicial inspection, but which may,
nevertheless, be tailored and scaled by individual states to meet distinct
preferences.
The goal in the end, to be clear, is not for the courts to co-opt the
redistricting process or even to establish uniform best practices. Quite the
opposite. The purpose, instead, is to grant each state room for flexible
redistricting decision making and some partisan leeway while looking for
sufficient evidentiary markers of impartiality in the process to win judicial
confidence that a redistricting plan does not fall below the baseline presumption
of constitutional fairness.
To bring the point home it may be helpful to consider, by contrast, a
redistricting plan that displayed no semblance of impartiality—the 2016 North
Carolina congressional map. Recall from Rucho that North Carolina
Republicans redrew the state’s congressional map to strongly favor Republican
candidates, with very successful effect.283 The process which led to that skewed
partisan effort included the following. The Republican-led state redistricting
committee hired a Republican districting specialist to create a map maximizing
Republican voting strength—that is, maximizing Democrat vote dilution.284
Expressly included among the list of approved redistricting criteria was
maintenance of the existing Republican partisan advantage.285 The committee’s
co-chair acknowledged the maps were drawn to maximize Republican
advantage, and the map was ultimately enacted on a party-line vote.286 It is
precisely this type of unabashed partisanship that, I contend, violates the
procedural due process requirement that affected individuals be given a “fair
opportunity to rebut”287 the government’s decision before a neutral
decisionmaker, and which judicial review guided by the above considerations
could forestall.
I have aimed thus far to show that procedural review of redistricting is not
only plausible under the Due Process Clause, but being squarely within the
federal courts’ competence, also manageable. Plausibility and manageability
are two-thirds of the Court’s wish list announced in Rucho, which represent the
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See id. at 2509–10 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2510.
Id.
Id.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
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watermark of any proposal advocating justiciability. The last remaining
precondition is to show that procedural review would limit the scope of judicial
intervention. I have already hinted at this prospect at various points throughout,
but I will directly address that final issue next.
C. Limited Scope of Judicial Review
To cap off my argument, I intend to meet the Court’s prudential concern
that partisan gerrymander review poses too great a risk of unwarranted judicial
encroachment into political affairs. The Court’s concern in this regard—voiced
as early as Bandemer and ultimately dispositive in Rucho—is that review
implicates questions of electoral fairness “outside the courts’ competence,” and
if not sufficiently constrained, such review could lead to “unprecedented
intervention in the American political process.”288 Moreover, “regular insertion
of the judiciary into districting”289 would incite political enmity toward the
courts.
I have suggested procedural review of redistricting decisions can allay such
concerns. The idea is not a new one. As other commentators have pointed out,
in contrast to the type of substantive review that gave rise to the Court’s
concerns, procedural review with its focus on decision making processes
attempts to “ameliorate the supposed tension between judicial review and
democracy.”290 The twin prudential virtues of a procedural approach to partisan
gerrymander review are, first, that it pulls the federal courts out of the tricky
business of reviewing substantive redistricting decisions for which they are illequipped; and second, that it simultaneously limits judicial intervention by
disciplining the scope of review, each of which virtues works to limit the
structural risk of judicial encroachment.
I will present two studies in support—one judicial and one academic. First,
to illustrate these virtues in practice, I will present a case study from a
superficially different but functionally similar context—state corporate law.
The development and application of the business judgment rule by state courts
is particularly germane to the present discussion because it shows that a
procedural approach actually works in practice both to preserve judicial review
and limit judicial intrusion. Second, to shore up the intellectual foundations of
a procedural approach to partisan gerrymander review, I will briefly survey
John Hart Ely’s theory of judicial review, which is itself premised upon the idea

288. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2494, 2498.
289. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 301 (2004) (Scalia, J.).
290. Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1709 (2002).

MORRIS_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022] PARTISAN GERRYMANDER REVIEW AFTER RUCHO

839

that courts have an important but narrowly limited—and procedurally
oriented—role to play in our constitutional system of government.291
i. Corporate Law and The Business Judgment Rule
The same overriding concern that animated the Court’s decision in Rucho
spurred and shaped the development of what is known as the business judgment
rule, a key concept in state corporate law.292 The rule, successfully applied in
the context of high-stakes shareholder litigation over decades by courts
throughout the country, resolves the uneasy judicial predicament presented in a
dispute between an elected and expert decision making body vested with
centralized decision making authority, on one hand, and an aggrieved balloter,
on the other. It operates in the context of corporate shareholder suits alleging
board misconduct as a judicial presumption that, “in making a business
decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.”293 That is the rule in its articulated doctrinal form, but to understand
it and draw out the relevant analogy to constitutional procedural due process
review and the Court’s concerns regarding judicial encroachment in the context
of partisan gerrymander review, it will help to understand the rule’s rationale.
The corporate form separates ownership and control.294 That separation can
sometimes lead to a misalignment of interests between those who own the
company (shareholders) and those who direct it (the board), by creating space
for incentives for self-dealing opportunism by board members vested with
decision making authority.295 In other words, there is a risk that board members
will act on their own partial interests rather than the shareholders’ broader
interests.296 There is, as a result, a “constant tension” in the corporate context
between board authority and accountability.297 In shareholder litigation
alleging board misconduct, the courts are asked to mediate that tension. As one
commentator put it, in words reminiscent of the Court’s framing of partisan
gerrymander review, “[c]hoosing the appropriate balance between authority

291. See generally ELY, supra note 209, at 90.
292. See Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 631 (2000);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83,
90 (2004); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“The business judgment rule exists
to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware
directors.”).
293. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)).
294. Bainbridge, supra note 292, at 105.
295. See id. at 107–09.
296. See id.
297. Id. at 129.
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and accountability is the central problem of business judgment
jurisprudence.”298
The challenge for courts reviewing shareholder-derivative suits, like that
presented by partisan gerrymandering claims, is one of measurement. The
difficulty is compounded by conspicuous asymmetries in expertise between the
authority making the decision and the court asked to review it—asymmetries
which courts recognize as a factor militating against casual intervention.299
Simply put, “judges are poorly positioned to evaluate the wisdom of business
decisions.”300 Mindful of the narrow bounds of their own competence,
moreover, courts are aware that a heavy judicial hand can invite litigation,
further disrupting board decision making and corporate function.301 The
business judgment rule constitutes the judicial response to the above concerns.
The rule “is designed to effect a compromise—on a case-by-case basis—
between two competing values: authority and accountability. These values
refer, respectively, to the need to preserve the board of directors’ decisionmaking discretion and the need to hold the board accountable for its
decisions.”302
Application of the rule and the grounds from which it emerged are
illustrated by Brehm v. Eisner,303 a well-known corporate law case decided by
the Delaware Supreme Court. In Brehm, the court rejected a suit brought by
Disney shareholders alleging the board breached fiduciary duties and wasted
company assets when it terminated the company’s President, costing the
company over $140 million in severance payout. Rejecting review of the
substantive fairness of the termination decision itself, the court, as a threshold
matter, examined the process which culminated in the board’s decision. The
court concluded that the board had adequately informed itself of the payout
economics and considered “pertinent issues surrounding” the termination, and
for that reason the board’s decision making process passed muster—even if the
decision itself was a bad one.304

298. Id.
299. See id. at 117–21; see also Dodge v Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)
(“[J]udges are not business experts.”); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979)
(“[C]ourts are ill equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate what are and must be essentially
business judgments. The authority and responsibilities vested in corporate directors both by statute
and decisional law proceed on the assumption that inescapably there can be no available objective
standard by which the correctness of every corporate decision may be measured, by the courts or
otherwise.”).
300. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313 (Del. 2015).
301. See id.
302. Bainbridge, supra note 292, at 84.
303. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
304. Id. at 263–64, 266.
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The case ultimately concerned a disagreement regarding the board’s
business judgment, but the court stressed that corporate law does not impose
“[a]spirational ideals of good corporate governance practices for boards of
directors.”305 To do so would, in the court’s words, “invite courts to become
super-directors, measuring matters of degree in business decision making.”306
That refrain should sound familiar. Notably, in reaching its conclusion, the
Brehm court underscored the procedural character of its review:
Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgments.
We do not even decide if they are reasonable in this context.
Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care
only. . . . Thus, directors’ decisions will be respected by courts
unless the directors are interested or lack independence relative
to the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that
cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach
their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the
failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.307
Shareholder litigation and partisan gerrymandering challenges arise from
superficially different facts and do not run in perfect parallel; nevertheless, each
is born from similar circumstances and presents similar exigencies that must be
harmonized when courts are called on to intervene. The lesson from corporate
law, captured in the business judgment rule, is that those exigencies—
specifically, the demand for governing accountability and the need for judicial
restraint—can be successfully mediated by procedural review. With a focus on
decision making process over substance the courts are able to mind their lane
while still redressing misconduct by decision making authorities.
ii. Ely’s Process-Based Theory of Judicial Review
Ely’s process-based theory of judicial review was motivated in large part to
address the very concern voiced by the Court in Rucho regarding judicial
encroachment into political processes. The Constitution’s short text includes
many gaps that need filling, and Ely’s concern was to find a way to justify the
Court’s role in that regard without inviting, as the Court in Rucho cautioned
against, judicial expansion into a “council of legislative revision.”308 Ely took
his cue from the text and structure of the Constitution, which, although
concerned with preserving individual liberty, was nevertheless heavily

305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 256.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 264, 264 n.66.
ELY, supra note 209, at 73.
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weighted toward procedural safeguards rather than substantive choices in its
design.309 As Ely explained:
[T]he selection and accommodation of substantive values is
left almost entirely to the political process and instead the
[Constitution] is overwhelmingly concerned, on the one hand,
with procedural fairness in the resolution of individual disputes
(process writ small), and on the other, with what might be
capaciously designated process writ large—with ensuring
broad participation in the processes and distributions of
government.310
On this process-oriented reading of the Constitution, the narrow role of the
federal judiciary seems clear—to police the government’s “mechanisms of
decision and distribution” while leaving substantive decisions to democratically
elected and politically accountable officials.311 With a focus on process over
substance, Ely argued, the courts retain an important role in guarding against
government abuse but without risking judicial encroachment into the “selection
and accommodation of substantive values.”312
Moreover, Ely noted, the courts are as “conspicuously” well-suited—based
on expertise and perspective—to address procedural questions as they are illsuited to address substantive ones.313 Questions regarding “what procedures
are needed fairly to make what decisions,” Ely insisted, “are the sorts of
questions lawyers and judges are good at.”314 The judiciary’s unique
competence thus felicitously aligned with the text and structure of the
Constitution, on Ely’s account, to both cabin the expanse of judicial review and
prevent the malfunction of political processes.
Ely likened his theory of judicial review to antitrust regulation, justifying
judicial intervention only when the “political market”—meaning representative
democracy—goes awry.315 Importantly, government does not go wrong simply
because “it sometimes generates outcomes with which we disagree.”316 That

309. Id. at 87–101.
310. Id. at 87.
311. Id. at 181. The Court itself has not wholeheartedly embraced a process-oriented mode of
judicial review, but it has nodded in that direction in limited circumstances. For a critical discussion,
see generally Frickey & Smith, supra note 290.
312. ELY, supra note 209, at 87.
313. Id. at 102 (“Lawyers are experts on process writ small, the processes by which facts are
found and contending parties are allowed to present their claims. And to a degree they are experts on
process writ larger, the processes by which issues of public policy are fairly determined: lawyers do
seem genuinely to have a feel, indeed it is hard to see what other special value they have, for ways of
insuring that everyone gets his or her fair say.”).
314. Id. at 21.
315. Id. at 103.
316. Id.
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can and will happen, but it does not justify judicial intervention. Regular
elections mean that representative democracy is capable of self-correction in
this respect—at least when properly functioning. Trouble arises when
irregularities emerge in the democratic process itself, thus eroding the health
and legitimacy of the political market. That is where, according to Ely, the
courts come in to play—to remedy problems in the process, which he described
as follows:
Malfunction occurs when the [democratic] process is
undeserving of trust, when (1) the ins are choking off the
channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and
the outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a
voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective
majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out
of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize
commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority
the protection afforded other groups by a representative
system.317
In other words, according to Ely, “unblocking stoppages in the democratic
process is what judicial review ought preeminently to be about, and denial of
the vote seems the quintessential stoppage.”318
Matters of voting and representation are fundamental presuppositions of
representative democracy, but the mechanics of their expression can
malfunction over time. According to Ely, independent and impartial judges as opposed to elected representatives who, based on obvious conflicts of
interest, “are the last persons we should trust”319 to identify and correct
malfunction - are particularly adapted to the task of identifying and stepping in
to facilitate correction of such malfunction.320 That task comports with and is
justified by the text and structure of the Constitution. And, importantly, it has
the further virtue of restraining the courts.321

317. Id.
318. Id. at 117.
319. Id. at 103.
320. Id. (noting that appointed judges are “in a position objectively to assess claims—though no
one could suppose the evaluation won’t be full of judgment calls—that either by clogging the channels
of change or by acting as accessories to majority tyranny, our elected representatives in fact are not
representing the interests of those whom the system presupposes they are”). Members of the Court
have at various times voiced a similar sentiment, including Justice Kagan in her Rucho dissent. As
Justice Kagan explained, “the need for judicial review is at its most urgent in cases like [partisan
gerrymandering]” because “politicians’ incentives conflict with voters’ interests, leaving citizens
without any political remedy for their constitutional harms.” Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct.
2482, 2523 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1941 (2018)
(Kagan, J., concurring)).
321. See ELY, supra note 209, at 73–104.

MORRIS_18MAY22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

844

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:787

Ely’s theory of judicial review is much grander than what I need for present
purposes—indeed, my limited proposal could be deduced as a special case. I
cite Ely’s example merely to add body to the notion that procedural review of
partisan gerrymanders should satisfy the Court’s prudential concerns and limit
judicial intervention.
VI. CONCLUSION
To wrap things up, judicial review of redistricting procedures versus
outcomes comports with the Constitution’s text and design; could be
manageably applied; and finally, should rebut and allay the Court’s repeated
concern that partisan gerrymander review will inevitably mire the federal courts
in politics. I began this Article by underscoring the preconditions for federal
judicial review as articulated in Rucho. As the preceding has shown, a
procedural approach to partisan gerrymander review under the aegis of the Due
Process Clause satisfies those preconditions.

